The most useful security idea in this episode started as a product question.
“We use this concept, we call it proof of possession, where an engineer has to prove to the system that they are in possession of a certain source code file, and then only we are reusing it.”
Dirk Meister, at 5:57
Dirk Meister was a founding engineer at Augment Code, the company building AI for software teams with large codebases, from September 2022 to December 2025. By his own account he joined when the company had four people, a few months before ChatGPT launched, and he built much of the production system: model serving, code indexing and retrieval, deployment, monitoring and security. Before that he spent almost eight years at Pure Storage and a year leading the CI team at Databricks, and before that he earned a PhD in Germany on data deduplication, after starting his career as an apprentice straight out of school. A note on where we sit, because it shows on the tape: when Sasha and I recorded this, I was Augment Code’s head of security, and YSecurity has run Augment’s SOC 2 Type 2 and ISO 42001 programs since 2024, so we talk about the company in the first person. Everything on this page about Augment comes from the tape or from what Augment and Dirk published. We published the episode on September 10, 2025, and the show notes were 42 words. This page is the rest of it: proof of possession, why a stolen token reaches the service and not the code, why Dirk doesn’t call himself a security person, why architecture is sticky, the questions that don’t fit in a checkbox, the big ask of sending source code to the cloud, customer managed keys and the ability to not trust the vendor, support access with a reason, the CI team in the middle of FedRAMP, the certifications, augmented and not replaced, the hardest day and the best ones, writing simply without lying, and what Dirk did after we hit stop. There are four things to try along the way: a quiz, a scorecard for whether your trust is built into the architecture, a calculator for how much standing access to customer data you have, and a timeline you can filter.
Ninety percent shared, ten percent yours
I asked Dirk whether, in the early days, an engineering problem had turned into a nice engineering solution with a security benefit. He went straight to the design he is known for inside the company. An AI coding assistant gets better the more of your code it can draw on, and in a company most of that code is shared.
“So like when the ninety percent of the repository that is shared between all engineers in the company, they prove that they have access to the shared files and then we complete out of that, and the ten percent they only have access to, then only they can get access to, because nobody else can prove possession of that file.”
Dirk Meister, at 5:57
The reason the ten percent matters is human, and Dirk was honest about it. “People shouldn’t put secrets or tokens into files, but let’s also be honest, that sometimes happens.” If the assistant completed from somebody else’s private files, “maybe they’re preparing a bash command or something like that, that would be horrible.” So even inside one enterprise, engineers are kept separate. The mechanism is in a post Dirk co-wrote with Markus Rabe in January 2025: Augment keeps “a real-time index of your codebase, for each user,” and before any content is used, “the IDE must prove to the backend it knows a file’s content by sending a cryptographic hash” (Augment Code).
“So this is proof [of] possession that came early on out of a product question, but I think it ended up really beneficial from a security perspective.” That sentence is the episode in miniature. Nobody wrote a policy that said engineers must not see each other’s secrets. The system was built so that it couldn’t happen, which is the kind of control that holds up when a policy wouldn’t.
A token reaches the service, not the code
I wanted to make sure I understood the strength of it, so I played it back: if someone took over my Augment Code account and tried to trick it into suggesting code from what I had already uploaded, they couldn’t, because they would have to prove they already had the files. Dirk put it more precisely.
“But like you cannot, with just the API token of a user, you cannot get access to the source code the user might have uploaded six months ago or a minute ago.”
Dirk Meister, at 13:24
A stolen token still lets someone use the system, “more than, than you’re allowed to do, or something like that,” which is a billing problem. “It does not grant access to the source code that was uploaded before. I think that’s an important difference.” It is a big one, and it is why I called it an incredibly powerful security position on the tape.
“That’s an incredibly powerful, like, security position to take, because now, like, a breach of credentials, which usually would mean like a breach of like the data that the credentials are protecting, is not actually a breach of the data.”
Jon McLachlan, at 13:55
Most incident reports start with a credential that was phished, leaked in a repository or lifted from a laptop. The usual answer is to protect the credential harder, with shorter lifetimes, device binding and more factors, and all of that is worth doing. Proof of possession adds a second idea: make the stored data unreachable with the credential alone. It is the same instinct as the 30-minute credential inventory, turned around. Instead of only asking what each key can reach, design the system so that the most valuable thing isn’t reachable by a key at all.
Not a security person
My first question to Dirk was whether he thinks of himself as a security person. “I actually don’t, but a lot of the work that I do is security, and I’m thinking about it.” He did a lot of Augment’s initial product security work and tried to make sure the right foundations were built to extend later. “But I’m not a security expert, I’m just really passionate about like getting that right, for us and for our customers.” Later in the conversation he explained why that distinction matters to him, with some arithmetic.
“Because security teams are only like what, five percent of a company, ten percent of a company. So 90% of the company is not the security team, the people that think about security all day long.”
Dirk Meister, at 7:37
Sasha had asked what customers should be asking about how a vendor protects the crown jewels. Dirk’s answer was that everybody says yes when you ask whether their engineering takes security seriously, so the useful question goes past the security team and tries to gauge the culture outside it. “Because if only the security team cares, you lost.” Most of the people who care about security at Augment, he said, were normal engineers on normal teams, spread around the organization, “have their ears on the ground.”
I’ve been on the other side of this, in a large engineering organization with a siloed security team, where security champion programs try to spread the knowledge one training at a time. It works, slowly. At Augment the culture came from the top, from the founders and the chief executive, and the reason was simple: customers were turning over their source code. That is the part of the episode I would hand to any founder hiring a first security person. The hire matters, and how you staff it matters, and none of it works unless the engineers who write the code own the outcome too.
Architecture is sticky
Sasha asked why security should come early, when a young company usually treats it as overhead. Dirk’s answer was his whole philosophy of engineering.
“Like when you get your architecture right, everything else becomes easier later. When you get your architecture wrong, everything becomes harder and harder. And I have seen companies dying on these kinds of mistakes.”
Dirk Meister, at 1:21
His example was personal data. If you introduce the right swim lanes at the beginning and know where data flows, then two years in “we don’t have to find out like, oh, some data is there and some data is a different place and somebody has like a shadow IT somewhere.” Otherwise you step back and redesign everything, which stops the company, and the cost “is not only in money but also time that it takes to redesign.” When I asked about his superpower, he came back to it: “five percent of thinking on a whiteboard or on a piece of paper can save you months and months later.” He was just as clear that this is a balance. A startup has to find product-market fit, iterate fast and take on tech debt, “but in a conscious way.” And it is a long race. “Startup is a marathon. It’s not a sprint.”
He gave the idea its shortest form in a post he wrote in January 2026, looking back on his time at Augment: “Code can always be fixed, but architecture is sticky,” and “I strongly believe security and trust is hard to bolt on later” (Dirk Meister). Security people have been saying a version of the second sentence for a long time. One of the best was on Hacker News in 2008.
"It would be nice if that were possible, but experience has indicated that security cannot be bolted on after the fact."
cperciva, on Hacker News, August 2008
That was Colin Percival, then FreeBSD’s security officer, answering a post that suggested you could add application security later with a module. Seventeen years later the founding engineer of an AI company said the same thing about a product that didn’t exist in 2008, which is the best evidence there is that it’s true.
The questions a checkbox can’t answer
Sasha pointed out that the foundations Dirk described build trust with prospects in a way that checkbox security doesn’t. Dirk agreed, and was careful about it. For Augment, which stores its customers’ source code, “security is like checkbox for them, but it’s also not checkbox for them.” The questionnaire still matters. What builds trust is being able to show “this is really how our architecture is built,” so the customer concludes “these are people who like know what they’re doing, who we can trust.”
“[The] questions that you cannot answer with the checkbox are, I think, the most important questions. Is the architecture built for security? Is not a checkbox, it’s complex, it’s messy, it’s not easy to answer.”
Dirk Meister, at 4:09
He didn’t claim to have a solution for scaling those conversations, and nobody does yet. What a vendor can do is make the architecture explainable, the way he did in public, and answer the questionnaire in a way that points at it. We wrote about the gap between a setting being on and a control actually working in enabled isn’t enforced, and about the format buyers use in what a DDQ is. The questions Dirk describes are the ones that come after the checkboxes, on a call with the buyer’s engineers.
We are asking a lot
I said on the tape that customers hand over their source code because they want their engineers to enjoy this new technology, and that there’s an adoption question underneath it: what happens to our code in the cloud? Dirk didn’t soften it.
“We are asking a lot. We are asking a lot from our customers. Like we are asking from them, hey, if you want to use our product, we need your source code to really, really work. That’s, that’s a big ask.”
Dirk Meister, at 11:37
Everyone would prefer the same quality without the code, he said. But with large code bases and complex organizations, the system relies on indexing the code base and getting the patterns out of it, so the only honest answer is to earn the trust: “it’s not something unimportant to them, it’s something that is really important to them, and we want to earn the trust as good as we can from as many people as we can.” Augment had launched publicly in October 2024, with co-founder Igor Ostrovsky putting the bet in one line.
AI + codebase knowledge -> supercharged coding!⚡️
Igor Ostrovsky (@igoro) · October 24, 2024
We are launching Augment Code, Developer AI for Teams. Augment Code understands your codebase, answers questions, suggests changes anywhere in your code, and a lot more.
Available to SW teams today. 📩DM me for access.
Dirk’s February 2025 post on the platform’s security set out the promises that go with the ask. “We do not train on your code or your messages, nor can engineers read them by default,” and the proof of possession system “ensures the AI only sees the code you’ve explicitly granted it access to” (Augment Code). The company said the same thing in a few lines that spring.
At Augment, we built our platform for high-trust environments:
Augment Code (@augmentcode) · May 6, 2025
- No training or retention—unless explicitly allowed
- No third-party access
- Real-time indexing for safe, relevant context
- Optional community mode for OSS, never default
Enterprise-grade by default.
The ability to not trust us
Sasha brought up customer managed keys, which Augment had added quickly because of how the system was already built, and asked Dirk why they matter. His answer is the best line in the episode.
“And the trust here comes from the ability to not trust us.”
Dirk Meister, at 21:39
The customer holds a cryptographic key and gives the vendor access to it, and if they ever want to walk away, they revoke it. “We don’t have to delete anything. Even when we don’t delete anything, we are, we are like, it’s useless to us. It’s just now random bytes.” Sasha called it cryptographic deletion, and Dirk agreed: the files, the data and the rows are all still there, “they are useless.” Augment made it live for enterprise customers on April 16, 2025, describing it as a key “you manage in your own environment,” and “If access to the key is ever revoked, Augment loses access to your data” (Augment Code).
Customer Managed Keys are now live for Enterprise Customers.
Augment Code (@augmentcode) · April 16, 2025
Manage your own symmetric encryption key. Revoke it, and Augment loses access to your data—immediately.
Cloud-native AI, now with full enterprise control 🧵
The reason it was quick is the architecture section again. “Because we knew exactly where our data is and how our data is stored, and we controlled the access to the data very tightly, it was a really swift project to add CMK to all the customer data in a way that’s transparent to the customers.” It wasn’t a rewrite, and nobody had to go find all the data first. A team that has to search for its own data before it can encrypt it is a team that will find some of it later, in an incident.
Access with a reason
I asked Dirk what he is most proud of in the system. It wasn’t a feature. It was a trade-off: how to keep security by default, with no access to customer data at all, and still be able to help a customer who asks for support.
“So it’s not about shutting everything down. It’s leaving this controlled holes that, on customer demand, we can look at the pieces that are relevant to the customers when they ask us to look at.”
Dirk Meister, at 23:00
Engineers can ask for access with a business reason, linked to a support ticket, and get it for a limited amount of time and for a limited set of data, “not the complete data.” Then the detail that makes it real: the check is not done once in the support website or the extension. “It’s a check that we do to the lowest level of the database access, so that it’s much more difficult and, I hope, impossible to, uh, circumvent.” Augment’s own description adds the second person: each request “is time-limited, audited and requires approval from a second person” (Augment Code).
I called it security in layers that goes all the way down into the infrastructure and connects to a real business need, and I’d add one thing for anyone building the same. The hard part is not the approval form. It is putting the check where the data is, so that a bug in a dashboard can’t skip it. The calculator further down compares standing access to this kind of grant for your own team.
The CI team in the middle of FedRAMP
Dirk got interested in security a little before Augment. At Databricks he was tech lead of the team responsible for continuous integration: all the test infrastructure, what gets tested, and also what can be merged to the main repository and what can be deployed. Databricks was going through FedRAMP Moderate at the time, and his team was in the middle of it.
“Can you bypass these checks? [Who] bypasses checks? How do we do glass breaking? How do we merge? What code is secure and trusted? What code is not secured?”
Dirk Meister, at 15:12
When he decided to leave for Augment, it stuck with him that Augment was “as security relevant and asking as much from our customers as Databricks [is] asking from their customers,” and he took the lessons with him. His LinkedIn fills in the rest: at Databricks he scaled the CI system, Runbot, by four times, and before that he spent from November 2013 to July 2021 at Pure Storage, which he joined, he said, at about sixty engineers and two hundred employees, leaving as a principal engineer who led engineering productivity (LinkedIn). Igor Ostrovsky, Augment’s co-founder, had been Pure Storage’s chief architect, and Dirk’s own account is that a former colleague invited him to the new AI for code effort. If you want to see the engineer before the AI, here he is in 2019, explaining Pure Storage’s portable snapshots at Cloud Field Day.
The thread through all of it is the question his CI team asked under FedRAMP: who can get around this check? It is the same question behind proof of possession and the database-level access check, asked by someone who spent his career on the systems that decide what is allowed to happen.
Landing the checkboxes faster
When Dirk talked about getting the security fundamentals wrong, “you will have big projects, big rewrites,” I picked up the other side of it: when you get them right, a whole bunch of other things fall into place, faster product-market fit, adoption in larger and larger organizations, and certifications.
“You can land certifications, even though those are just checkboxes, you can land them much more quickly, like SOC 2 Type 2.”
Jon McLachlan, at 19:29
I said on the tape that Augment was, I thought, the first engineering AI platform with a SOC 2 Type 2, and Dirk said he thought so too. The record is more modest than our memory, and it’s still good. Augment’s attestation came on July 10, 2024, after an observation window from April 1 to July 1, and its announcement said “other AI tools, like GitHub CoPilot, have yet to reach this level of SOC2 Type II” (Augment Code). That is a comparison at the time, not a first, so treat my line on the tape as enthusiasm. ISO/IEC 42001, the management system standard for AI, is better documented: Augment announced the certification on May 29, 2025 (Augment Code), and its certification body’s release was headlined “Augment Code Becomes First AI Coding Assistant to Achieve ISO/IEC 42001 Certification from Coalfire Certification” (Coalfire). My line about Augment being the thirty-somethingth company in the world to get it is from memory, and I couldn’t find a published count to check it against.
Because YSecurity ran both programs, I can say what made them quick, and it was mostly what this page is about. The data flows were known, access to customer data was already gated, and the controls were in the system rather than in a document. We wrote the engagement up as case studies, SOC 2 Type 2 in five months and ISO 42001 in 93 days, and the phase-by-phase timeline is in how long a SOC 2 audit takes. Dirk added the customer’s side: some of Augment’s users are security conscious “sometimes to a painful extent,” and “they look at us [very] deeply, and they come out and say yes, that’s, that’s the one that we can trust.”
Augmented, not replaced
Sasha asked what advice Dirk would give a new engineer or a founder. He called himself an old schooler: foundations matter, and computer science is not overhead. Then he turned to the tools he builds.
“If you trust the AI completely and you don’t read it anymore, you will be in quite a problem in six months.”
Dirk Meister, at 28:17
It is still the engineer on the other side that matters, he said, from someone who built AI for code professionally. “This company is called Augmented, not Replaced, for a reason.” Use the AI as much as possible, “but don’t trust it. Always have a healthy amount of mistrust. Be curious. Stay learning.” I’d put it the way I put it for agents: the software is ours, the prompts are ours, and so are the results, so we understand it, test it and keep a playful sense of adventure about what it can do. Dirk’s list of what doesn’t change is the useful part. The fundamentals of computer science and software engineering, and the skill of getting requirements out of people that actually hold, like translating what a salesperson is really asking for. “It’s a skill set that was valuable twenty years ago. I deeply believe it will be a skill set that is really important to you in 20 years.”
He went further back than that. Software engineering has been a team sport for a long time, and “when you look back to like the classical papers about software engineering of like Fred Brooks,” the problems they solved are the ones we solve now. Brooks’s The Mythical Man-Month came out in 1975, and its most famous line is still true: “Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later” (Wikipedia). The work of review, the same discipline we wrote about in agentic code review and SOC 2, is how you keep the mistrust healthy without slowing everything down.
The hardest day, and the best ones
I asked about his most difficult day. It was leaving Databricks, a company with a fantastic culture that was doing well. But the chance to build something new came along, at a time when AI for code wasn’t yet the hot topic it is now.
“And I think AI for code is [the] biggest change in how software is written, at least in the last thirty, forty years. Being part of that was something that I really wanted to do. But it was a really tough day.”
Dirk Meister, at 25:02
I said you need a sense of adventure for that, the decision that the world is changing and you want to be part of it. He agreed, and added the line I’d put on a wall: working at a startup as a founding engineer, “[when] you’re getting comfortable, you’re doing something wrong.” Would he have believed six years earlier that he would work on product security? “No.” Sasha asked about the brightest day, and Dirk picked the darkest ones: a big outage, when engineering and leadership come together, work through a tough problem and restore the service. “So it’s, it’s like this [camaraderie] that comes out of, uh, this intense pressure.” Those are the days he looks back on most fondly.
Write it simply, and stay truthful
My last question was the one I ask everyone: what would you tell your younger self? Dirk was a math kid who didn’t see the point of learning to write, or of learning English, living in Germany. “I think I was wrong. I think writing is a really important skill.” He learned it in technical writing courses at university, and now gives the same advice to the early career engineers he mentors. I plugged the articles he had written for Augment, which explain hard ideas plainly, and he gave the rule he writes by.
“And you want to do it as simple as possible without going to the point of lying. Like you can explain everything simple, but sometimes you’re like, that’s actually no longer true.”
Dirk Meister, at 33:11
Find the right abstraction for the right person and stay truthful, because “it’s all about trust,” he said, “especially, I think, in security.” It is also how he explained proof of possession on this show, and how he wrote it up in public, which is why the design is easy to check. Sasha asked who had made the biggest impact on his career, and the answer was a set of people, not one: mentors at his apprenticeship after high school who guided him to university when he hadn’t gone straight from school, then on to a PhD, and the smart people he has looked for at every company since, “standing on the shoulders of giants.” His PhD was at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, on advanced data deduplication techniques, after a bachelor’s and master’s at Paderborn University (LinkedIn). And he likes an office: a whiteboard, coffee talks, and, as an introvert, the forcing function of being in the same room.
What happened after the tape
Dirk’s last day at Augment was December 5, 2025, and a month later he wrote up the whole journey, from storage to engineering productivity to AI for code (Dirk Meister). It is the best companion to this episode. He describes joining as a founding engineer when the company had four people, building a custom inference stack for embedding models, an indexing system that handled thousands of files per second, CUDA kernels and the TypeScript of the VS Code extension, and why latency is a product feature: “A good code completion that appears after 300ms will be accepted by developers,” and “The same completion arriving after 700ms? Too late.” He also names the two Augment posts he co-wrote, on the security approach and the real-time index, as the place to read the design. In January 2026 he joined Google as a staff software engineer (LinkedIn).
“I strongly believe security and trust is hard to bolt on later.” He wrote it after he left, and it is what he said on the tape, which is the best sign that it was never a slogan.
Did you catch it? A six-question quiz
Interactive · six questions
Did you catch it?
Six questions on what Dirk actually said, with the timestamp for each answer. The answers are under each question for anyone reading without JavaScript.
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What does proof of possession require before Augment uses a source file?
- A manager's approval for each repository
- Proof that the engineer is in possession of that file
- A second login from a trusted device
b. "an engineer has to prove to the system that they are in possession of a certain source code file, and then only we are reusing it." Transcript, 5:57.
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What can someone do with a stolen user API token, in Dirk's words?
- Use the system, but not read the source code uploaded before
- Download the user's whole repository
- Nothing, because tokens can't be stolen
a. "It does not grant access to the source code that was uploaded before." Transcript, 13:24.
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Where does the trust in customer managed keys come from, according to Dirk?
- From the audit report
- From the encryption algorithm
- From the ability to not trust the vendor
c. "And the trust here comes from the ability to not trust us." Revoke the key and the data is random bytes. Transcript, 21:39.
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What was Databricks going through when Dirk led its CI team?
- An initial public offering
- FedRAMP Moderate certification
- A move to a new cloud provider
b. "At the time, Databricks was going through their FedRAMP Moderate certification process." Transcript, 15:12.
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What share of a company is the security team, by Dirk's estimate?
- Five to ten percent
- About a quarter
- About half
a. "security teams are only like what, five percent of a company, ten percent of a company." Transcript, 7:37.
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What did Dirk do right after high school?
- Went straight to university
- Joined Pure Storage
- Worked as a software engineer apprentice
c. "I started working as like a software engineer apprentice, and I found great mentors there." Transcript, 33:55.
Is your trust built into the architecture?
Dirk’s test for a vendor is whether the architecture was built for security, which no checkbox can answer. This scorecard asks eight questions about your own product, in the order the episode raises them, and tells you whether your security is a checkbox, present in places, or in the architecture.
Scorecard · eight questions
Is your trust built into the architecture?
Answer for the product that holds your customers' most sensitive data, as it runs today. If two answers fit, pick the lower one.
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Do you know where every kind of customer data lives, including personal data?
- Not really, and there is some shadow IT
- Mostly, for the main production systems
- Yes, by design: swim lanes, owners and a data-flow map kept current
"we know where data flows all the time." It is what made customer managed keys a swift project instead of a search.
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If an attacker steals one user's API token, what can they read?
- Everything the account can see, including stored content
- Only data within a narrow scope
- The service, not the stored data: reading content needs a second proof, such as possession
"you cannot get access to the source code the user might have uploaded six months ago or a minute ago." The token section has the design.
-
Inside one customer, can one user's private data show up for another user?
- Yes, everything is shared within the account
- Role-based separation, enforced in the application
- Per-user separation enforced on the server, for private data like the ten percent
Secrets end up in files. A colleague's completion should never contain them.
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Who holds the keys to your customers' data?
- The cloud provider's defaults, and nobody has thought about it
- Encrypted at rest with keys you manage
- Customers can hold their own key and revoke it, which works as cryptographic deletion
"the trust here comes from the ability to not trust us."
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How do your engineers get access to customer data?
- Standing access to production data
- By request, but broad and long-lived
- Time-limited, scoped to a support case, approved by a second person
The calculator below turns your answer into access-hours a week.
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Where is that access check enforced?
- In the user interface
- In the application's API
- At the lowest layer, on the path to the database or storage itself
"It's a check that we do to the lowest level of the database access." A bug in a dashboard shouldn't be able to skip it.
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Do you train on or keep customer content?
- By default
- By default, with an opt-out
- Never by default, and engineers can't read it by default either
A commitment to no training or retention unless explicitly allowed is only as good as the architecture that enforces it.
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Who cares about security in your company?
- The security team, if there is one
- Champions in some teams
- Engineers on every team, with security as their partner
"Because if only the security team cares, you lost."
The questionnaire answers are probably true, and the architecture underneath them isn't doing much of the work: a stolen token reads stored data, access to customer data is standing, and nobody could say exactly where the personal data lives. Start with the map. Write down where every kind of customer data lives this week, then put a time limit and a second approver on every human path to it.
Some of the right decisions are in the system, and some are still in a policy. Move the access check down to where the data is, separate users inside an account for the data that is theirs alone, and design so that a credential reaches the service without reaching the stored content.
A stolen token reaches the service, not the data, customers can hold their own keys, access to their data opens only with a reason and closes on its own, and the culture doesn't depend on the security team. Write it up the way Dirk did, simply and truthfully, so a buyer's engineers can check it.
How much standing access do you have?
Dirk is proudest of the trade-off between no access by default and access for support. This calculator compares the two for your team: how many hours a week customer data is open to engineers with standing access, how many it would be if access opened only for a support case, and how much smaller that is.
Calculator
How much standing access do you have?
Engineers who can read customer data today, the support cases a week that actually need it, and how long a just-in-time grant stays open.
With 20 engineers who can read customer data 168 hours a week, customer data is open for 3,360 engineer-hours a week. If access opened only for a support case instead, 10 cases a week at 4 hours each is 40 engineer-hours, about 84 times less, or 172,640 fewer access-hours a year, and every remaining hour has a ticket and a reason behind it.
An access-hour is one engineer able to read customer data for one hour, whether or not they do. It counts exposure, not use, which is the point: a stolen laptop or a phished engineer with standing access is open every hour of the week. The 20 engineers, 10 cases and 4-hour grants are placeholders, not research. Augment's design added a second approver to every request and enforced the check at the database layer, which this calculator doesn't model.
From Paderborn to proof of possession
Everything on this page sits on one timeline, from Dirk’s first degree to the month he joined Google. Filter it by thread.
Timeline · 1975 to 2026
From Paderborn to proof of possession
Filter by thread. Dates are from the public record except where marked as Dirk's own account on the tape.
- The Mythical Man-Month
Fred Brooks's book, the classic Dirk points to (Wikipedia).
- An apprenticeship
A software engineer apprentice in Germany, and mentors who pushed him toward university.
- Paderborn University
A bachelor's and a master's in computer science (LinkedIn).
- "cannot be bolted on"
Colin Percival on Hacker News, on adding application security after the fact (Hacker News).
- A PhD at Mainz
Advanced data deduplication techniques, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (LinkedIn).
- Pure Storage
Through July 2021, ending as principal engineer for engineering productivity (LinkedIn).
- Portable snapshots
Dirk presents at Cloud Field Day 5 (YouTube).
- Databricks
Tech lead of the CI team, during FedRAMP Moderate, by his account on the tape (LinkedIn).
- A founding engineer
Augment has four people, and ChatGPT hasn't launched yet (Dirk Meister).
- Out of stealth
A $227 million Series B, with founders Igor Ostrovsky and Guy Gur-Ari (Business Wire).
- SOC 2 Type II
The attestation, after an April to July observation window (Augment Code).
- Augment Code launches
"AI + codebase knowledge" (X).
- A real-time index
Per user, with a hash to prove possession, by Dirk and Markus Rabe (Augment Code).
- Securing the code that writes code
Dirk's post on the platform's security (Augment Code).
- Customer managed keys
Live for enterprise customers (Augment Code).
- ISO/IEC 42001
Certified by Coalfire, a first for AI coding assistants (Coalfire).
- Episode 77 airs
This conversation. "the ability to not trust us."
- A last day at Augment
After three years and four months (Dirk Meister).
- "architecture is sticky"
Dirk's look back at AI for code, and a staff software engineer role at Google (Dirk Meister).
What to do this week
Four things, in the order Dirk would do them.
- Draw the map. Write down where every kind of customer data lives, personal data first, with an owner for each store. Anything you discover along the way is the shadow IT Dirk warned about, and the map is what makes everything after it quick.
- Make a stolen token worth less. List what one user’s credential can read today. For your most sensitive stored data, add a second proof to reading it, the way proof of possession requires the file itself, and keep one user’s private data out of everyone else’s results.
- Close the standing access. Replace standing access to customer data with grants that are tied to a support case, limited in time and scope, approved by a second person, and checked where the data lives rather than only in the interface.
- Give customers the ability to not trust you. For the customers who need it, offer keys they hold and can revoke. Then write the whole design up simply and truthfully, so a buyer’s engineers can check it instead of a checkbox.