Podcast Episode 56

Episode 056 48 min

Kayne McGladrey, Field CISO at Hyperproof, SEC 10-K and Cybersecurity Leaders

with Kayne McGladrey · Hyperproof

0:00 / 48:00

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Episode 56 of The Security Podcast of Silicon Valley, published October 15, 2024 and recorded in March 2024. Host Jon McLachlan talks with Kayne McGladrey, then field CISO at Hyperproof, about the SEC's new cybersecurity disclosure rules and what they mean for security leaders and startups. Kayne describes going from theater kid to cybersecurity, why every CISO he knew worried about the first Section 1C filings, the SolarWinds case and a security statement written by marketing, disclosing too little or too much, the eleven topics the best 10-K disclosures cover when the SEC requires four, third-party risk management, paper tigers and continuous evidence of control operation, why cybersecurity risk doesn't exist on its own, tying key risk indicators to business KPIs, making business leaders pay for the insurance on risks they accept, the fiction of sizing risk with FAIR alone, SPACs and circular disclosures, risk registers, a maturity model for GRC, the civil liability CISOs carry, Conway's law, the Clue board game, FedRAMP, a guest badge log with Thursday missing, and when a startup should hire a CISO. About 48 minutes.

Episode notes

Join us in this episode of the Security Podcast in Silicon Valley, where host Jon McLachlan sits down with Kayne McGladrey, Field CISO at Hyperproof. Kayne shares his unique journey from theater to cybersecurity, offering insights into risk management, regulatory compliance, and the evolving landscape of cyber threats. Discover how his background in improv and theater has shaped his approach to cybersecurity, the importance of SEC 10-K disclosures, and practical advice for startups and security professionals. Don't miss this engaging and informative conversation!

Hosted by Jon McLachlan — co-founder of YSecurity.

The deep dive

Write it down, then prove it

Kayne McGladrey, then field CISO at Hyperproof, with Jon on the SEC's new cybersecurity disclosures, the eleven topics companies put in Section 1C of the 10-K when four were asked for, SolarWinds and a security statement written by marketing, paper tigers and continuous evidence, why cybersecurity risk doesn't exist on its own, key risk indicators, making the business pay for the insurance, FAIR, SPACs and circular disclosures, risk registers, a maturity model for GRC, the civil liability CISOs carry, Conway's law, the Clue board game, FedRAMP, a guest badge on a Thursday, and when a startup should hire a CISO.

Episode 56 of The Security Podcast of Silicon Valley aired on October 15, 2024, with Jon McLachlan hosting. The guest was Kayne McGladrey, then the field CISO at Hyperproof, a company whose software teams use to run their compliance and risk programs. Jon asked about his background, and the answer started a long way from security.

“I am a theater kid who eventually decided that there was not a lot of money in theater.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 0:27

He took what he learned on stage into security work, ran professional services, served as a CISO, and by the time of the recording had picked up one more skill he hadn’t planned on.

“And my special skill that I’ve most recently adopted, and it wasn’t on my bingo card for this year, is reading investor regulatory filings for the SEC in the 10-K.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 1:18

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 0:26
About 35 seconds: Kayne on going from theater to security audits in the late 1990s. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

His LinkedIn fills in the years between (LinkedIn). He was a software architect at Safeco Insurance from 1999 to 2001, building single sign-on for 250,000 agents and 10,000 employees, then a systems engineer on Cingular Wireless’s directory services from 2002 to 2006. He spent almost 11 years at Centrify from January 2006, as worldwide professional services director, then ran information security services at Integral Partners from November 2016. From September 2018 to April 2020 he was CISO and CIO at Pensar Development, an industrial design and manufacturing firm with aerospace work, and from April 2020 he led strategy and the GRC practice at Ascent Solutions. He joined Hyperproof in September 2022. Along the way he co-founded Include Cybersecurity with Carmen Marsh, a nonprofit his profile describes as “dedicated to changing the face of cybersecurity professionals.” His headline lists him as a CISSP and a senior member of the IEEE. LinkedIn calls the Hyperproof role CISO in residence, and on the tape he called it field CISO.

The conversation was recorded in March 2024. That fits the tape: Jon mentions Hyperproof’s 2024 benchmark report, which came out on February 23, 2024, and Kayne promises a blog post that went up on March 25. It aired seven months later. Since then the SEC’s case against SolarWinds was dropped, the federal review board Kayne mentions lost its members, Hyperproof published the maturity model he was drafting, and he left Hyperproof at the end of 2025. He now works as a fractional CISO, and his book is out from CRC Press. The last section below covers that.

This page is the rest of it: a section for each part of the conversation with the sources beside it, thirteen figures, fourteen clips from the tape, a LinkedIn card, the full transcript, and four tools: a quiz, a scorecard for whether you could prove your controls run, a calculator for how long a failed control could go unnoticed, and a timeline from the Clue board game to his book.

A word on framing before the sections. Kayne said on the tape that he isn’t a lawyer, and nothing here is legal advice either. The SEC’s rules apply to public companies. The reason a startup should care, as he explained it, runs through its investors, its board members and its biggest customers.

From theater kid to the 10-K

Kayne’s own description of his path was that it doesn’t look like most people’s.

“And I took the improv skills that I’d earned and parlayed that into a cybersecurity career, which is a weird origin story, right?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 0:36

Improvisational theater, per Wikipedia, is the form in which “most or all of what is performed is unplanned or unscripted” (Wikipedia). His first security work sounds closer to that than to a textbook.

“I remember doing security audits, both in person as well as physical security as well as network security for government agencies in the late 90s and making a lot of it up as I go along, which was exciting.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 0:47

He credited a really good team back then, many good teams since and three mentors over his career. The newest skill was the one that set up the episode: reading the annual filings public companies make with the SEC. Form 10-K is “an annual report required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission” (Wikipedia), and he said he could now read one “in about two seconds at a crack.”

Jon suggested it was a different type of singing and dancing, and Kayne agreed that the stage never left him.

“This is true. And I still am very comfortable on stage and with a live audience.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 1:40

His LinkedIn bears that out. For his Hyperproof years it lists “150+ media outlets, 75+ podcasts, and 30+ industry keynotes,” a bi-monthly compliance podcast called Drafting Compliance, and the annual IT benchmark surveys he led.

A timeline of ten entries. Late 1990s, audits: security audits for government agencies, in person, physical and network, by his account on the tape. 1999, Safeco: software architect, building single sign-on for 250,000 agents and 10,000 employees. 2002, Cingular: systems engineer on directory services, until 2006. January 2006, Centrify: worldwide professional services director, for almost 11 years. November 2016, Integral Partners: director of information security services. January 2018, Include Cybersecurity: co-founder of the nonprofit, with Carmen Marsh. Filled, September 2018, Pensar Development: CISO and CIO, until April 2020. April 2020, Ascent Solutions: strategy and GRC practice lead. Filled, September 2022, Hyperproof: CISO in residence on LinkedIn, field CISO on the tape, until December 2025. Filled, December 2025, fractional CISO for small and mid-market companies across seven western states. His line underneath: I am a theater kid who eventually decided that there was not a lot of money in theater.
From the theater to the 10-K: the roles on Kayne's LinkedIn, and the CISO roles the episode turns on.

What the SEC asked for

Jon asked what the new 10-K disclosures are and why Kayne had been reading them. The answer began with how companies had treated the topic until then.

“So the reason I’ve been tracking that is most companies have had this concern over disclosing how or if or what they’re doing around cybersecurity.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 1:52

Then the change. As Kayne dated it, late last year, in October, the SEC told companies to explain how they manage cybersecurity risk and how the board and management are involved. The record puts the rules a little earlier. On July 26, 2023, the SEC adopted rules requiring registrants “to disclose material cybersecurity incidents they experience” and to describe, every year, their cybersecurity risk management, strategy and governance (SEC).

There are two parts. An incident report goes on Form 8-K under Item 1.05, generally due “four business days after a registrant determines that a cybersecurity incident is material,” with a delay possible if the U.S. Attorney General finds that disclosing right away poses a substantial risk to national security or public safety. The annual description is Item 106 of Regulation S-K, filed in the 10-K, and covers how the company assesses, identifies and manages material cybersecurity risks, how the board oversees them, and management’s role and expertise. The annual part applies to fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2023, the incident reports began on December 18, 2023, and smaller reporting companies got 180 more days for those.

Kayne’s reason for reading every one of the new filings was that nobody had written one before.

“And so the reason I started studying it is it’s never been done before, and there’s going to be a train wreck in there.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 2:30

“And somebody’s going to do it really well, and somebody’s going to do it not so well.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 2:35

The worry wasn’t only his. He said the CISOs in the invite-only roundtable he runs, “for about 100 close friends,” were all anxious about the same thing: making a regulatory filing that says here’s how we manage our cybersecurity risks and here’s how the board gets involved, for the first time, in public.

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 2:14
About 25 seconds: Kayne on why every CISO he knew was worried about the first filings. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.
Two boxes side by side. On the left, Form 8-K, Item 1.05, for a material cybersecurity incident: generally due four business days after the company determines an incident is material, a delay possible if the U.S. Attorney General finds a substantial risk to national security or public safety, and begun December 18, 2023, with 180 more days for smaller reporting companies. On the right, a filled box, Form 10-K, Item 106 of Regulation S-K, every year: how the company assesses, identifies and manages material cybersecurity risks, how the board oversees those risks, and management's role and expertise, for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2023. Kayne's line underneath: and so the reason I started studying it is it's never been done before, and there's going to be a train wreck in there.
The two disclosures the SEC adopted on July 26, 2023, and when each one started.

A statement written by marketing

The second reason was a lawsuit. Kayne described the run-up this way, and it is his account of the events.

“Tim Brown of SolarWinds had done a really bang-up job of helping disclose to the CSRB, the Cybersecurity Review Board, about how they had been dealing with Russia being all up in their cybers.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 2:46

The board’s full name is the Cyber Safety Review Board. The Secretary of Homeland Security established it on February 3, 2022, “Modeled after the National Transportation Safety Board,” and its first report, on July 11, 2022, covered Log4Shell (Wikipedia). Then came the part that worried every CISO Kayne knew.

“And unfortunately, the SEC felt fit to file a civil lawsuit against Tim Brown, the CSO of SolarWinds, as well as SolarWinds, based on statements that were not regulatory in nature, like the security statement on their website, which, as best as everyone can tell, was like written by marketing.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 2:58

SolarWinds reported the breach of its Orion platform to the SEC on December 15, 2020. Per Wikipedia, the SEC sued the company in October 2023 for allegedly downplaying internal security risks before news of the attack, and “the case was dropped in November 2025” (Wikipedia). At the time of the recording the case was open, and Kayne’s reading of it was that the regulator had already chosen what it would enforce.

“So they already decided: hey, we’re going to go enforce based on their alleged non-operation of security controls and what was in a non-regulatory filing.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 3:18

The lesson outlived the case. A security page, a trust center or a questionnaire answer is a statement about your controls, whoever wrote it. If marketing drafts it, security should be able to prove every line.

Too little, too much

The new filings put the same pressure on a document that carries a signature.

“That sets up a really interesting narrative: if you don’t disclose enough, investors might not have confidence, or the SEC might not have confidence.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 3:33

Disclose too much, and two fears follow. The first, which he said many law journals raised, is that attackers will read the filing to plan a better attack, which he hadn’t seen happen. The second is a material misstatement found after a breach, when the regulator asks for evidence.

“Like you said you were running, I don’t know, multi-factor authentication for all of your end users. Prove that to us.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 4:05

“And when a regulatory subpoena shows up on your front, it’s not a good day.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 4:12

That one sentence explains the rest of the episode. The disclosure itself is the easy part. The hard part is the record that backs it up, kept well enough to hand over on the day someone asks.

Three columns. On the left, too little, a light disclosure: investors might not have confidence, and the SEC might not have confidence. On the right, too much, a detailed disclosure, drawn dashed: law journals feared attackers would use it, which Kayne hadn't seen happen, a material misstatement found after a breach, and a subpoena that says prove it. In the middle, a filled box, what holds up, evidence behind each claim: say only what you can prove, keep the record that proves it, and hand it over on the day someone asks. Kayne's line underneath: and when a regulatory subpoena shows up on your front, it's not a good day.
Too little disclosure costs confidence, and too much invites a demand for proof, as Kayne laid it out.

Vendors in the filing

Some companies went further than anyone asked, all the way to naming suppliers.

“I hope they got a sales discount from their vendor because I can think of a couple that like mention specifically who their vendors are, which is an interesting thing.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 4:27

Jon asked the obvious follow-up.

“What is not some sideways avenue of marketing or exposure to risk?”

Jon McLachlan, at 4:36

“I can think of one that specifically said we use Microsoft Azure for our entire tech stack, all up.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 4:41

Another filing named its providers for EDR, endpoint detection and response, and for IR, incident response. Kayne’s point was what that does over time: these filings would make 2024 and beyond a very interesting space for regulators and litigators, “because a filing that’s made right now exists in perpetuity and it’s a public record.” A list of tools in a public document is a map for whoever reads it, and it is still there after you switch vendors.

What it means for a startup

Jon brought it back to the listeners, many of them founders or early employees at security startups, selling into the companies making these filings.

“And if I’m one of these founders in a security startup and I’m part of one of these companies’ supply chains or I’m a vendor to one of these companies, what does that really translate to for me?”

Jon McLachlan, at 5:11

Kayne gave two answers. The first is where most startups are headed.

“The first is that most startups want to eventually either get acquired or exit via a PE or they want to go public.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 5:27

Either way, the institutional investor, the private equity buyer or the public market will want to see the company doing security in a reasonable fashion, which he noted is still not a legal standard, and looking like the other companies that do it. The second answer reaches startups that aren’t selling or listing at all: board members. A startup that shares a director with a public company gets that director’s expectations.

“They’re going to have these same level expectations because for them, this is their new normal.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 6:41

He expected those expectations to spread through the whole ecosystem of private startups and suppliers, as board members and investors come to see the disclosures as normal. A company that can’t make the same statements, or whose program is unusual for its industry and doesn’t know it, is “going to have a bad time,” he suspected. Our post on the security slide your board deck is missing is a practical place to start.

Eleven topics where four were required

The count that made Kayne’s analysis useful was how much companies chose to say.

“And there are about 11 factors that I found that came across all the most robust 10-K Section 1C, and the SEC only requires four of those.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 6:01

Jon asked whether a SOC 2 Type 2 report would get a startup over the bar, and answered his own question.

“But SOC 2 is not going to be, it’s not going to cut it.”

Jon McLachlan, at 7:39

Kayne had the write-up ready.

“Yeah, so I’ve got a blog post up that will be up after this podcast is finished recording about those 11 factors.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 7:42

Hyperproof published it on March 25, 2024, as “Cybersecurity in Financial Disclosures: 11 Topics for 10-K Filings” (Hyperproof). The author reviewed Section 1C disclosures from the start of January, more than 2,100 filings between January 1 and March 11, 2024, and over 40% of them disclosed eleven distinct topics. The post’s summary is that “almost half of companies are sharing additional information on eleven different topics.” The four things the SEC asked for, in the post’s words, are identifying and managing risks, disclosing material breaches, board oversight and management’s role. (The page carries a newer byline after a January 2026 update, and its text is written in the first person.)

The eleven topics, in the post’s order, are frameworks, governance, risk assessments, risk management, enterprise risk management, third-party risk, compliance, incident response plans, training, the audit committee and the board of directors. The post marks risk assessments, risk management and the board as required and the other eight as beyond what was asked. A few numbers from it: 51% of filings reference frameworks, attestations or regulations, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is cited in 29%, and training is “the most common technical control discussed” at 83%. The audit committee gets a nickname, the “kitchen sink committee,” for how much lands on it.

Eleven numbered topics in three columns: 1, frameworks. 2, governance. 3, risk assessments, filled. 4, risk management, filled. 5, enterprise risk management. 6, third-party risk. 7, compliance. 8, incident response plans. 9, training. 10, the audit committee. 11, the board of directors, filled. Below, bars for some of the post's numbers, as a share of the filings it reviewed: 83% discuss training, the most common technical control. 51% reference frameworks, attestations or regulations. 29% cite the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 4% cite PCI-DSS. 3% cite SOX. 3% cite HIPAA. 2% cite FFIEC guidance. Kayne's line underneath: and the SEC only requires four of those.
The eleven topics from Hyperproof's March 2024 review of Section 1C filings, with the three it marks as required.

For a startup, the list doubles as a checklist. If a public company customer describes its program in those eleven terms, its security team will ask its vendors about the same eleven things.

Any framework, and who tells who

Kayne went through the topics that go furthest past the minimum, starting with the ones a startup might assume it already has covered.

“But these go beyond things like having a SOC 2 or an ISO.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 7:55

“So, for example, one of the top factors is use of literally any cybersecurity framework.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 8:02

He didn’t care which one. The NIST framework came up most, under several names, including once as the “NIST CFS.” The NIST Cybersecurity Framework dates to 2014 (Wikipedia), and companies cite it, he said, as a proxy for saying they know what they’re doing because they follow an industry standard. Governance was next, and he put the whole topic in one line.

“And that’s a broader topic of, when something happens, who knows when, who tells who?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 8:29

Some governance disclosures were tremendously detailed and some were light, and neither frameworks nor governance were required. What the SEC did require includes risk assessment and risk management, under the section of Regulation S-K he was reaching for on the tape, Item 106. Inside those, one subject stood out.

“Something nobody expected would be in there, but is very much in the cultural zeitgeist of cybersecurity right now, is third-party risk management.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 9:04

Some companies disclosed their vendor process in so much detail that Kayne said he wouldn’t want them as an account. One described an 11-step process that would send an auditor to audit a supplier in four hours, even one holding an ISO 27001 certification and a SOC 2 Type 2 report, as if four hours could beat both. ISO/IEC 27001 is the standard that sets the requirements for an information security management system (Wikipedia), and SOC 2 is one of the AICPA’s system and organization controls reports (Wikipedia).

“So there’s some disclosures in there that are just pure nightmare fuel”

Kayne McGladrey, at 9:44

If you sell to a company like that, the work is front-loaded: a current report, an answer library and someone who can take the call. Our sales support team answers security questionnaires and joins the buyer’s review as your security team.

A paper tiger

Whatever a company discloses, Kayne said, it needs the confidence that it is factually correct.

“Because the thing you don’t want to get caught out in is running a paper tiger where it works that way on paper, but it doesn’t actually exist in reality.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 9:58

A paper tiger, per Wikipedia, is something that “claims or appears to be powerful or threatening but is actually ineffectual” (Wikipedia). In a filing, it is a control that exists in a policy and nowhere else. In a security review, the common version is a setting that is enabled but not enforced, which our post on five questionnaire answers that quietly cost you the deal walks through. He expected that to go badly from a litigation and enforcement perspective, with a caveat he repeated more than once.

“Again, I’m not a lawyer. I’m not making legal advice.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 10:10

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 9:44
About 30 seconds: Kayne on nightmare fuel, factually correct disclosures and the paper tiger. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.
Two columns. On the left, drawn dashed, on paper, what the policy and the filing say: the policy says every user has multi-factor authentication, a screenshot from last year's audit, and a framework the company made up for its disclosure. On the right, a filled box, in reality, what a system shows every day: a system checks the control hourly or daily, a record for every day kept in one place, and evidence you can hand over when a subpoena arrives. Two lines from Kayne underneath: running a paper tiger where it works that way on paper, but it doesn't actually exist in reality. And: you need to prove that you're actually collecting evidence on an hourly or a daily basis associated with the control operation.
A paper tiger next to the real thing: the same control, with and without evidence that it runs.

Continuously

Jon, who had noted that neither of them is a lawyer, asked whether a product like Hyperproof gives that confidence by checking the controls every day.

“you have the constant reinforcement that the controls are being audited daily?”

Jon McLachlan, at 10:22

“Continuously. Continuously. I think that makes a big difference.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 10:28

His example was a filing he wouldn’t name.

“They just full-on made up a fictional cybersecurity framework, and it’s in their public disclosure.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 10:38

The fix he described is a standard of evidence, not a better paragraph.

“You need to prove that you’re actually collecting evidence on an hourly or a daily basis associated with the control operation.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 10:52

That limits the regulatory and investigative risk after a material breach, and it also answers the question a CISO asks of every vendor. Maybe it’s EDR, maybe it’s a security operations center run as a service that watches the company’s SIEM, the security information and event management system that collects its logs.

“I want to know that the darn thing works so that I keep paying the bill”

Kayne McGladrey, at 11:23

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 10:28
About 30 seconds: Kayne on a made-up framework in a public disclosure, and the evidence that would have caught it. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

He tied it to Hyperproof’s 2024 survey, which found that companies with a continuous assurance approach to their GRC platform, or to managing risk, had a substantially reduced risk of a data breach. Then he was careful about what that means.

“it is correlation, I should say, where we’re not saying this is absolutely a way to avoid the risk of a data breach, but it makes sense.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 12:03

The report is Hyperproof’s fifth annual IT risk and compliance benchmark, published on February 23, 2024 from a survey of more than 1,000 IT and GRC professionals (Hyperproof). Among its findings, 59% of respondents had a data breach in the previous 24 months, and “those still operating in silos are more likely to experience a breach.” His explanation for why the connection makes sense was about shared facts.

“If people are looking at the same thing, at the same set of facts, they’re going to make way better decisions”

Kayne McGladrey, at 12:09

The alternative he described was three or five different Excel spreadsheets and the work of figuring out, from them, how a risk is being managed. The 11-topic post makes the same point about enforcement: “future enforcement actions will likely require evidence of continuous control operation.”

There is no cybersecurity risk

Jon put the board’s side of it plainly. Directors allocate the company’s resources, including how much goes to security.

“how can you tell a paper tiger from the real deal?”

Jon McLachlan, at 12:39

Kayne said what works with boards isn’t what CISOs had been doing, and started with the most quotable line of the episode.

“I think a lot of us as CISOs have been guilty over the years of, first of all, saying that cybersecurity risk exists. It doesn’t. We have business risks. We manage business risks.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 12:52

“Cybersecurity is certainly a factor of business risk, but it is not itself a risk. Controversial opinion, I know.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 13:01

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 12:42
About 25 seconds: Kayne on why cybersecurity risk doesn't exist on its own. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

Two and a half years later the idea had become a book. His LinkedIn headline now lists him as the author of Cyber Risk is a Myth, from CRC Press, and on October 28, 2026 he posted about discussing it on Chris Clymer’s show.

I joined Chris Clymer on his show to talk about my book, and I came away convinced the term does more damage than anyone admits. Calling something "cyber risk" tells every executive without a technical background that it belongs to a specialist somewhere else in the building. The problem is that the specialist usually doesn't exist.

Kayne McGladrey · October 28, 2026
Kayne on LinkedIn, October 28, 2026, on his book and why the term cyber risk does damage. View on LinkedIn.

That post is the same argument from the tape, sharpened. If a risk is filed under cyber, it sounds like somebody else’s problem to every leader who isn’t technical. If it is filed under the business outcome it threatens, it has an owner.

A KPI and a key risk indicator

The second thing CISOs had been doing wrong, Kayne said, was the link to the business.

“But the other thing we’ve been doing is we’ve been failing to tie to business objectives.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 13:09

What matters most to a board is the company’s key performance indicators, so his method starts with the business leader’s KPI and attaches a risk measure to it.

“And then you need to tie a KRI, a key risk indicator, to that. That’s a way to get board engagement.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 13:34

A performance indicator measures how well an organization achieves its objectives (Wikipedia). A key risk indicator, per Wikipedia, is “an early signal of increasing risk exposures” (Wikipedia). His example was data exfiltration, an unauthorized transfer of data from a computer (Wikipedia). Counting uploads to Google Docs or Dropbox and USB disks plugged into computers is the security team’s view of it.

“You put that in front of a board, it’s a snooze fest.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 13:52

The same data means something when it is tied to a goal the board already tracks. HR wants happy employees and measures employee satisfaction. Security knows something about people who are about to leave.

“about six weeks before they decide, I’m done, I’m leaving, I’m going to go look for another company, they exfil all their data.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 14:10

A salesperson takes the book of business, an engineer takes the code in the repo, and both leave about six weeks later. Tied to HR’s KPI, the exfiltration count becomes a KRI.

“It’s a leading indicator for how that point is going to go.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 14:33

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 13:40
About 35 seconds: Kayne on the data exfiltration numbers a board ignores, and the HR goal that makes them matter. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.
Two rows. In the first, drawn dashed, the security metric, counts of uploads, Dropbox and USB disks, leads to the board, a snooze fest in his words. In the second, a filled box, the KRI, data leaving before a resignation, points back to HR's KPI, employee satisfaction, and forward to a leading indicator, about six weeks ahead. Three lines from Kayne underneath: you put that in front of a board, it's a snooze fest. And then you need to tie a KRI, a key risk indicator, to that. That's a way to get board engagement. And: it's a leading indicator for how that point is going to go.
One measure, two framings: the exfiltration count as a security metric and as a key risk indicator on HR's goal.

The general rule he drew is that leaders should look for these intersections, where the data security already has can inform how successful the business will be.

No perfectly secure system

Jon liked tying security back into the business, because a security team can spend any budget under the sun and still have business risks at the end of the day. He put the case against chasing perfection in his own words.

“I would argue that those don’t exist, that there’s always going to be risk and that we have to navigate that risk”

Jon McLachlan, at 15:24

The lens he suggested is the business’s own. Most businesses want to grow, and he named the report that often carries that growth: “I know that SOC 2 Type 2 often is like the go-to growth mechanism.” As companies get larger, he said, he was happy to hear that people are caring and that things are changing for the better.

Then you pay for the insurance

Kayne’s next story came from friends who are CISOs, and it starts with a familiar ritual. The team finds a risk above the company’s tolerance, sends the risk form to the business leader, and asks for a signature.

“And they say, cool, I accept the risk. Job done. Nothing changes.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 16:23

“And then we wonder why are we continuously living a dumpster fire.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 16:27

The CISOs he knew who had made a difference ran the same process with one change. When the business leader chose to accept the risk, the acceptance came with a bill.

“Cool. So you’re going to pay for the insurance on that.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 16:48

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 16:38
About 15 seconds: Kayne on the CISOs who made accepting a risk come with an insurance bill. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

He said this was happening at several companies where he has friends, and the reaction is what changes behavior.

“wait, you’re telling me I’m going to take a five to six figure loss on my P&L for this quarter to buy incident response insurance and remediation insurance against a risk”

Kayne McGladrey, at 17:00

A report to the board on how long vulnerabilities stay open, and which department never closes them, doesn’t do that on its own.

“If they’re just printing money all day long, the board’s not going to care.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 17:27

A cost the leader owns does. It gives them a reason to get rid of a legacy system or patch their systems, because if their KPI is financial performance, the risk is now tied to it. Cyber insurance, per Wikipedia, protects businesses from risks relating to their information technology (Wikipedia), and Kayne admitted the approach can be a bit draconian. His verdict on it was short: “It’s working, right?” Jon’s summary was shorter.

“You’re owning the cost and not just the risk.”

Jon McLachlan, at 19:04

Two rows of four boxes. The first row, drawn dashed after the first box: a risk above tolerance, the form sent to the leader, signed with I accept the risk, and nothing changes, a dumpster fire. The second row, filled after the first box: a risk above tolerance, accept it and then pay to insure it, the bill of five to six figures, and change, as the narrative shifts. Lines from the tape underneath. Kayne: and they say, cool, I accept the risk. Job done. Nothing changes. And: cool. So you're going to pay for the insurance on that. Jon: you're owning the cost and not just the risk.
Two ways to accept a risk: sign the form and nothing changes, or own the cost and the narrative changes.

A fictional number

The same partnership, Kayne said, is needed when you size a risk.

“There’s this fiction that CISOs can magically use something like FAIR to figure out how much a risk will cost if it becomes an impact, right?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 19:24

FAIR, factor analysis of information risk, is “a taxonomy of the factors that contribute to risk,” and Wikipedia adds that “It is not a methodology for performing an enterprise risk assessment.” (Wikipedia). Kayne’s objection was to the inputs, not the math.

“I can ask the salesperson, the sales leader, I can ask the engineering leader, how much does this thing make on an hourly basis? But I don’t inherently know that myself.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 19:36

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 19:23
About 20 seconds: Kayne on why a CISO can't size a risk's impact alone. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

Without that collaboration, the number in front of the other leaders is fictional, and “where did this come from?” is a legitimate question. He went further: ethically, he said, CISOs and security leaders don’t have the ability to put forth a material number, especially now that the SEC’s rules turn on materiality, the auditing and accounting idea of how significant an amount, a transaction or a discrepancy is (Wikipedia).

“let’s partner with the business to figure out what is the potential impact there as opposed to just wet finger in the wind and making up a number.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 20:24

Favorite disclosures

Jon asked for his favorite Section 1C disclosure. Kayne pointed him to LinkedIn, where Jon said his posts are “hilarious and so much fun to follow.” The last one Jon remembered was a sad bear on a park bench, and Kayne said “that was about the DOJ whistleblower.” The approach, he explained, is a habit from his years on Twitter.

“LinkedIn is way too serious.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 21:20

“I read way too many law journals and I’m reading regulatory filings for fun.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 21:26

Then the favorites. A wine company he was pretty sure was among the worst he had read. And a whole category.

“There’s the whole category of SPAC, special purpose acquisition company, where they just don’t do cybersecurity at all.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 21:43

“They say they don’t have a cybersecurity program, don’t plan on having one.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 21:50

A SPAC is “also known as a blank check company” (Wikipedia), a listed shell company set up to buy a private company later. Kayne said he had to look up what that is. His other favorite was a filing that pointed at itself. It said the SEC required these disclosures in Section 1C, listed the regulatory requirements it had to meet, and then sent the reader in a circle.

“And then they said, for more details, see Section 1C.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 22:16

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 21:42
About 35 seconds: Kayne on SPACs with no security program and a disclosure that points at itself. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

A few were combative in tone, written as if the SEC had forced the words out of them, and he hoped an SEC staff attorney who, he said, was reading his analysis would weigh in on how companies were reacting. The 11-topic post has a phrase for the type: “minimal or occasionally combative-toned disclosure.” The contrast he drew was with the companies that took the rule well.

“Because some are welcoming it. They’re being very transparent.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 22:48

Best and worst written

Jon asked whether the combative ones were technology companies. Mostly the opposite, Kayne said.

“Tech companies, actually, software and SaaS providers tend to be some of the best written.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 23:01

“I think the only ones that are more comprehensive are in the aerospace and defense space.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 23:07

He admitted a bias, having worked in aerospace and defense himself. What makes the tech filings strong, he said, is that CISOs are bringing basics in, including at companies that had somehow never had them.

“And the company they’re at goes, that’s a neat idea. We never thought of that before.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 23:29

The idea in question was a risk register. In the best filings he saw comprehensive disclosures around risk, governance and the board, including how security communicates with the board and, in some cases, outside consultants brought in to advise it. At the other end he put oil and natural gas exploration, an industry he used to try to do risk assessments for, where, as he remembered it, the companies could make money their way out of almost anything.

“I think, a quarter billion dollars was sort of their risk threshold.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 24:25

“It’s like anything above that line might be a business risk. We’ll get back to you.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 24:28

A risk register, written down

Jon heard the never-had-a-risk-register story with two reactions at once. One was disbelief.

“how did you get to be so successful and so large without just the basics?”

Jon McLachlan, at 24:58

The other was generosity. We’re always learning and growing, he said, and maybe a company just didn’t have the right person with the right expertise in the right place at the right time.

“I have this view of companies are just groups of people, right?”

Jon McLachlan, at 25:17

People come together to make a product or provide a service, they owe something to each other and to their customers, and with a diverse group the answer to what the right thing is will vary wildly. That is what standards are for. He ended on the oldest rule he knew.

“do not invent your own cryptography. Just don’t do it.”

Jon McLachlan, at 26:23

A risk register, per Wikipedia, is “a document used as a risk management tool and to fulfill regulatory compliance” (Wikipedia). It is the same idea applied to risk: a standard form, so nobody has to invent their own.

A maturity model for GRC

Kayne agreed, and said it led to the project he was working on.

“It goes to an area that I’ve been working on for some time now, which is the concept of a maturity model for governance, risk, and compliance.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 26:28

Governance, risk and compliance, GRC for short, is a holistic approach to the three that took shape in the 2000s (Wikipedia). The problem he described is that the CISOs it reports to know what they’re doing but couldn’t tell you how to get better at it. Cybersecurity has many maturity models, of varying quality. GRC had nothing like them.

“And yet, GRC has become this intractable space where it’s a cult of personality.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 26:58

Someone who was a partner, or on track to be one, at a big four firm brings a well-rounded view of governance and compliance. Someone well-meaning without that background knows how to meet the standard in front of them, but hasn’t seen what good or bad looks like, and the company never builds the organizational muscle memory for its first SOC 2 Type 2 or ISO 27001. Telling a team to “do governance better” doesn’t help, he said, “because that’s like saying be healthy.” His model would name the core business processes inside governance and risk and the outcomes each one should produce.

“I hope to publish something later this year in this space”

Kayne McGladrey, at 28:24

The draft was about 180 pages, he said, and some of his roundtable friends had asked to read it. Hyperproof introduced its GRC Maturity Model in a webinar on August 1, 2024 (Hyperproof), and the model has its own page today (Hyperproof). His LinkedIn lists it among his work there.

Two columns. On the left, drawn dashed, do governance better, like saying be healthy: a cult of personality, good if a big four partner built it and otherwise luck, no path forward for the first SOC 2 Type 2 or ISO 27001, and no organizational muscle memory. On the right, a maturity model, like saying eat better: the core business processes inside governance, the core processes inside risk, the outcome each one should produce, and how to get better at each one. Three figures below. 180 pages, the draft as Kayne described it in March 2024. August 1, 2024, Hyperproof introduces its GRC Maturity Model in a webinar. December 2025, Kayne leaves Hyperproof after three years and four months. His line underneath: and yet, GRC has become this intractable space where it's a cult of personality.
Be healthy versus eat better: a vague instruction next to the specific processes and outcomes Kayne said a GRC program needs.

Boundless civil liability

The reason the model mattered to him went beyond process. It was about the people doing the job.

“But where that comes to a concern for me is, as a person who has a lot of friends who are CISOs or senior levels of senior leaders in security, the amount of civil risk that we carry becomes a big disincentive to staying in the career.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 28:38

Without directors and officers insurance, indemnification or an umbrella policy, a security leader carries that risk personally. D&O insurance, per Wikipedia, is “liability insurance payable to the directors and officers of a company” (Wikipedia). And the leader depends on an organization that may not know how to get better at its job.

“and everything they write down that you sign in some cases is a reason you could go to court and lose everything.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 29:11

He had the Tim Brown case in mind, and he was blunt about where it left his peers.

“But in terms of civil liability, CISOs right now have boundless civil liability, and that concerns me deeply, right?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 29:23

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 28:37
About 40 seconds: Kayne on the civil liability CISOs carry, and what it does to the career. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

He cited a study from the year before, which he didn’t name, that found 75% of CISOs were considering leaving their jobs for mental health reasons, and said he couldn’t imagine that had improved in 2024 with Section 1C now in force. His aim for the maturity work was to give people discipline and peace of mind, so that companies get more resilient and more effective, and so that senior leaders don’t panic and leave one day, as he put it, “because I could go to court just for showing up.”

Frustrated regulators

Jon thanked him for stepping up for the community.

“All the gratitude in the world for stepping up and providing some foundation for this.”

Jon McLachlan, at 30:21

Kayne said the 180-page draft was in a final editorial pass, and that he was hopeful. Then he looked back at how he got here.

“I had no idea what normalcy looked like.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 30:55

He said he might not have chosen the career had he known the social pressure, the economic pressure, the litigation and the personal liability, and he never expected to read regulatory filings and jurisprudence, “which is a $5 word,” for a living. He read the regulators’ side with some sympathy. They keep seeing personal data breached and money moving out of Western countries, he said, and they aren’t seeing progress.

“And so the regulators are becoming more prescriptive.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 31:52

“What can we each do within our community to try and make that a little bit better for everyone?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 32:01

Half can’t find their critical risks

Jon called that the mark of a real leader, then turned to the survey Kayne had presented, Hyperproof’s fifth annual IT benchmark.

“nearly half of the companies struggle with identifying critical risks so that they can prioritize the remediation.”

Jon McLachlan, at 32:28

The report’s number is 49% of respondents, who “struggle with identifying critical risks to prioritize remediations” (Hyperproof). Kayne’s explanation went back to the risk register.

“So I think that is a product of how companies have not had risk management discipline beforehand.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 32:39

Some companies have no register. Others have five, or 12.

“Everybody’s got their own personal risk register.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 33:00

At a global defense company, separate registers with controls on who can see what are the nature of the business, he said, and elsewhere they aren’t. Scattered registers hurt strategy, insurance and careers. A CISO who isn’t told that the budget went to a global expansion ends up frustrated, and five business units with five ways of measuring risk can’t agree on what to fix first. His test from his advisory work was simple.

“one of the first things I’d ask folks was if they could show me in writing what a low-impact reputational risk was, or a high-impact regulatory risk.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 34:01

“Don’t tell me verbally, show me on paper,” he said. Without a common language, risk assessments turn into arguments over how big a risk is and whether it matters, and the same disagreement repeats across every register and every head it lives in.

On the left, five small dashed boxes, registers R1 to R5: each unit measures risk its own way, the rest lives in people's heads, and risk assessments turn into arguments about the words. On the right, a filled box, one risk register: a low-impact reputational risk, defined in writing, a high-impact regulatory risk, defined in writing, and one place, one language everyone agreed on. Two figures below. 49% of respondents struggle to identify critical risks to prioritize remediations, from Hyperproof's 2024 benchmark. 5 or 12 risk registers at some companies, by Kayne's account. His lines underneath: everybody's got their own personal risk register. And: don't tell me verbally, show me on paper.
Five registers and no shared language, next to one register with written definitions, after Kayne's test.

Conway’s law and a prophet

Jon connected that to something he had watched as an engineer.

“What I’ve noticed coming up through the engineering ranks is that the software that engineers tend to write will reflect the communication channels within the company.”

Jon McLachlan, at 34:40

That is Conway’s law, named for Melvin Conway’s 1967 observation, which describes “the link between communication structure of organizations and the systems they design” (Wikipedia). Jon asked whether risk registers and risk language follow the same pattern, and sketched the extremes. At Apple, in his telling, there is a prophet and everyone listens. In a startup, everyone is running around doing whatever needs doing. In the middle, people build little empires that go to war with other parts of the company, and all of that politics shows up in the product, the code and the risk language.

Kayne had seen it from the outside, brought in to assess how companies got where they were.

“And often it comes to communications channel breakdowns or it comes down to expectations breakdowns.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 36:19

“If there’s an annual risk assessment process and only 20 percent of the company knows about it, how well of a treatment of your risks do you think you’re going to have?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 36:24

He granted that this sounds boring. The cure he described is committee meeting notes: a record that one named person agreed to mitigate a risk and another agreed to transfer one to insurance.

Professor Plum in the library

Then he explained why the notes matter, with a board game.

“The funny thing, though, is if you don’t write it down, often things come down to, do you remember the old Clue board game?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 36:57

“Professor Plum in the library with a lead pipe? That’s what investigators always come back to: who, what, where, when, how.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 37:04

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 36:57
About 15 seconds: Kayne on the Clue board game and the questions investigators ask. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

Clue is the North American name for Cluedo, which Wikipedia says Anthony E. Pratt devised in 1943 (Wikipedia). The game’s question is the investigator’s question, and after a breach it costs engineering time. A company without the habit of writing things down and keeping them in one place gets asked, after the fact, to show how each control was operating, and it gets asked twice.

“They’re getting it from the legal team in preparation for future litigation, and they’re getting it from the internal incident response team”

Kayne McGladrey, at 37:49

If nothing was written down and kept up, he said, the outcomes vary wildly.

Five questions in a row, who, what, where, when and how, each with an arrow down to the record that answers it: a named owner, the control, the system, a timestamp, and the process. Below, two dashed boxes for the two teams that ask after an incident: the legal team, preparing for future litigation, and the incident response team, working out what was going on. Kayne's lines underneath: Professor Plum in the library with a lead pipe? That's what investigators always come back to: who, what, where, when, how. And: they're getting it from the legal team in preparation for future litigation, and they're getting it from the internal incident response team.
Who, what, where, when, how: the questions investigators ask after an incident, and the record that answers each one.

FedRAMP writes everything down

The cleanest example of the discipline was the program Hyperproof was working toward at the time.

“That’s something that we’re also working on at Hyperproof is a FedRAMP. And you want to go through a documentation exercise, they will have you write everything down.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 38:11

FedRAMP is the U.S. government’s compliance program for cloud products, which provides “a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring” (Wikipedia). Kayne compared it to an engineering change process. It is prescriptive about what has to be written down, how, how often it has to be maintained and how long the records are kept, and a startup that wants to sell to an agency finds the documentation hard to meet if it never built the habit for its commercial customers. ISO certifications are similar: “honestly, they love their documentation, right?” Hyperproof finished the job: on March 12, 2026 it announced that it “has launched a FedRAMP Moderate-authorized version of our platform” (Hyperproof).

He added a test of how far the culture reaches. When one part of a large company goes for FedRAMP, ISO or GxP, the good-practice rules of the life sciences, the assessment usually covers the whole company’s business processes, and that is when leaders learn how well their message has been getting out. If federal customers are on your roadmap, our FedRAMP readiness team starts with that documentation.

One org or many

Jon described the two ways he had seen security organized. In one, a CISO owns everything underneath: product security, infrastructure security, corporate security, governance and compliance, and maybe a red team as a feedback loop. In the other, the work is spread out, with product security inside engineering and corporate security under IT.

“And I’m not even sure where the red team ends up in an org like that.”

Jon McLachlan, at 40:20

He asked whether one structure serves a CISO, or the public interest, a little better. Kayne said both work.

“I think both of those are viable. What ultimately matters is ongoing sustainability and observability and transparency.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 40:50

What matters more, he said, is a way of proving it, and he was precise about the bar.

“If you were being investigated as part of a legal investigation, could you prove it?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 41:19

It is “a high standard that I advocate for,” he said. Saying you do something, having someone say it on the record and collecting log files or screenshots now and then don’t meet it. Continuous inspection of control operation does, centralized or not, and the org chart is irrelevant to the people asking.

“A lawyer does not care about how you structured your company.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 42:13

A guest badge on Thursday

Without continuous evidence, Kayne said, a smart investigator, whether from an insurer or a litigator, looks at the gaps. He made it concrete.

“Let’s say you have a policy that says you log everybody who comes in your front door, you hand them a guest badge.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 42:36

The badges come back at the end of each day, and the records are complete for every day except Thursday.

“they say, so what happened Thursday? And you go, I don’t know.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 42:52

“Whether or not anything happened on Thursday is not really of interest at that point.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 42:58

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 42:34
About 25 seconds: Kayne on the guest badge log with Thursday missing. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

The missing day is the finding, because it is the absence of evidence for the argument that you were doing the thing. FedRAMP works the same way. It isn’t a once-a-year exercise, he said, but continuous compliance, and falling out of it locks a company out of seven- and eight-digit contracts. Jon’s reply was one word: “Painful.”

Five day boxes. Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday are filled, badges logged. Thursday is dashed, no record. An arrow drops from Thursday to the investigator, asking so what happened Thursday, and under that a dashed box, the answer, I don't know. Kayne's lines underneath: let's say you have a policy that says you log everybody who comes in your front door, you hand them a guest badge. And: whether or not anything happened on Thursday is not really of interest at that point.
A week of guest badge records with Thursday missing, and the question an investigator asks about it.

Weaponize it

Kayne turned the burden into an advantage.

“Right. You have to be able to prove you have a continuous assurance process.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 43:23

“And I think that as companies look at these opportunities, the advantage is you start thinking about cybersecurity, you can weaponize it.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 43:28

A SOC 2 Type 2 or another outside attestation lets a company show customers and its supply chain that it is more secure than the alternatives, and probably more trustworthy than its competitors. Jon called it a market distinguisher. Kayne agreed, and said the distinction wouldn’t last.

“I think at some point we’re going to hit table stakes where everybody’s got a SOC 2 Type 2, right?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 44:01

What is no longer a differentiator becomes a blocker to getting into a market. Jon had already seen it in AI startups raising $70 million seed rounds.

“They came out of stealth with a SOC 2 Type 2.”

Jon McLachlan, at 44:33

He saw it quickly becoming table stakes, especially for companies chasing larger contracts. Our SOC 2 Type 2 team works on that timeline, from readiness to a Type 2 report.

When to hire a CISO

Jon asked the question he hears most from founders, whatever they build.

“when is the right time to pull in a CISO, or a security leader?”

Jon McLachlan, at 44:57

“I go back and forth on this one. And I think it’s after your Series B, unless you had a real banger of a Series A.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 45:01

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 45:00
About 25 seconds: Kayne on hiring a CISO after the Series B, and what has to be in place first. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

Series B, maybe Series C, is when he would start thinking seriously about a security leader, because some things that have to be in place usually aren’t before then. One is D&O insurance for the board and the senior leadership team. Another is coverage for the CISO, “either as a named individual or by rule.”

“But if you’re not offering them a D&O spot in today’s climate, they have really no reason to join your company.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 45:43

Jon’s reply: “Huge liability.” Kayne added two more conditions. There has to be enough engineering product and enough of the other business functions built out, and he was careful to say that doesn’t make security an add-on. The point is centralizing the responsibility for communicating and overseeing security. Well-intentioned people can get a company to a Series B, with some hits and misses along the way.

“Companies with CISOs have hits and misses.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 46:25

“your business model has to prove out too before you bring in somebody to do security, right?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 46:38

Jon summed it up and Kayne agreed.

“You need to have something worth securing before you dump a bunch of investment on top of it.”

Jon McLachlan, at 46:43

Before that point, most companies need a part-time security leader more than a full-time one. Our guide to what a vCISO is, what it costs and when a startup needs one covers the trade-off, and our vCISO team comes with the security engineers to do the work.

Four funding stages linked by arrows: seed and Series A in outline, Series B and Series C filled. Under Series A, unless a real banger of a Series A. Under Series B, his answer, or a Series C. Below, what has to be in place first: D&O insurance for the board and the senior leadership team, the CISO on the D&O as a named individual or by rule, enough engineering product and the other business functions built out, and a business model that has proved out. Lines from the tape underneath. Kayne: I go back and forth on this one. And I think it's after your Series B, unless you had a real banger of a Series A. Jon: you need to have something worth securing before you dump a bunch of investment on top of it.
When to hire a CISO, by Kayne's account: after the Series B, with D&O coverage, a product worth securing and a business model that has proved out.

Give back

Jon asked for final words of wisdom.

“I think you said it earlier on the show, Jon, and it’s really about giving back to the community.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 46:58

That means helping the field develop and diversify, and bringing different ways of thinking into what he called a challenging space over a challenging few decades. His question for senior leaders listening:

“how do I give back effectively and how do I incentivize people to get into this industry?”

Kayne McGladrey, at 47:21

“There’s a lot of different ways of thinking that we need that are not really well represented today.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 47:33

Listen · Kayne on episode 56, from 46:56
About 30 seconds: Kayne's closing advice to senior leaders on giving back. The clip stops on its own. Read the full transcript.

If you can influence a young person or someone changing careers, he said, take the chance, one-on-one or en masse. He has done it at scale before: Include Cybersecurity, the nonprofit he co-founded, set out to change who works in the field. And for anyone who wanted to find him, there was no ambiguity.

“There’s only the one of me. Thanks, mom and dad, for the unique name.”

Kayne McGladrey, at 47:58

What happened after the tape

The post. On March 25, 2024, Hyperproof published the 11-topic analysis Kayne promised on the tape (Hyperproof). It covers more than 2,100 filings and names the SolarWinds case, which it gives as case 1:23-cv-09518 in the Southern District of New York.

The maturity model. On August 1, 2024, Hyperproof introduced its GRC Maturity Model in a webinar (Hyperproof), the model Kayne hoped to publish that year.

On air. The episode aired on October 15, 2024 (Podbean), and it is also on Spotify.

The review board. On January 21, 2025, it was reported that all members of the Cyber Safety Review Board had been fired (Wikipedia).

SolarWinds. In November 2025 the SEC’s case against SolarWinds was dropped (Wikipedia).

A new role. Kayne left Hyperproof in December 2025, after three years and four months, and has worked since as a fractional CISO for small and mid-market companies across seven western states, where, in his profile’s words, he helps them “translate risk into financial terms” (LinkedIn). Hyperproof’s author page now calls him “Former Field CISO at Hyperproof” (Hyperproof).

FedRAMP Moderate. On March 12, 2026, Hyperproof launched its FedRAMP Moderate-authorized platform (Hyperproof), the program Kayne said it was working on.

An advisory board. In August 2026 he joined the advisory board of c², which his profile describes as “an AI-native GRC platform.”

The book. His book, Cyber Risk is a Myth, is out from CRC Press, and on October 28, 2026 he posted about discussing it on Chris Clymer’s show (LinkedIn).

A timeline of nine entries. March 25, 2024, eleven topics: Hyperproof publishes the review of more than 2,100 Section 1C filings. August 1, 2024, the maturity model: Hyperproof introduces its GRC Maturity Model in a webinar. Filled, October 15, 2024, on air: episode 56 airs. Dashed, January 21, 2025, the review board: all members of the Cyber Safety Review Board are reported fired. Dashed, November 2025, SolarWinds: the SEC's case against the company is dropped. December 2025, a new role: Kayne leaves Hyperproof and starts work as a fractional CISO. March 12, 2026, FedRAMP Moderate: Hyperproof launches its FedRAMP Moderate-authorized platform. August 2026, an advisory board: Kayne joins the advisory board of c², an AI-native GRC platform in his profile's words. October 28, 2026, the book: he posts about Cyber Risk is a Myth, from CRC Press.
What happened after the tape, from Hyperproof's 11-topic post to the book.

The part of the conversation that aged best is the plainest. Write the risk down, in one place, in a language everyone agreed on. Make the person who accepts a risk own what it costs. And collect evidence that each control runs, continuously, because the question after an incident is never whether you had a policy. It is what happened on Thursday.

Did you catch it? A six-question quiz

Six questions from the episode. Each answer links the moment in the transcript.

Quiz · six questions

Did you catch it?

Pick an answer for each. The explanation shows once you choose.

  1. What did Kayne say about cybersecurity risk?

    1. It is the biggest risk a company has
    2. It doesn't exist on its own. There are business risks
    3. Only the CISO can own it

    b. "saying that cybersecurity risk exists. It doesn't." Transcript, 12:56.

  2. By Kayne's count, how many of the eleven topics in the best Section 1C disclosures did the SEC require?

    1. Four
    2. All eleven
    3. Two

    a. "and the SEC only requires four of those." Transcript, 6:08.

  3. What changed things when a business leader chose to accept a risk?

    1. A second signature on the form
    2. A report to the board
    3. Paying for the insurance on it

    c. "Cool. So you're going to pay for the insurance on that." Transcript, 16:48.

  4. Which board game did Kayne bring up?

    1. Monopoly
    2. Clue
    3. Risk

    b. "do you remember the old Clue board game?" Transcript, 37:01.

  5. In the guest badge example, what does the investigator ask?

    1. What happened Thursday
    2. Who designed the badges
    3. How many guests came that week

    a. "they say, so what happened Thursday?" Transcript, 42:52.

  6. When did Kayne think a startup should bring in a CISO?

    1. Before the first engineering hire
    2. Only after going public
    3. After the Series B, unless the Series A was a real banger

    c. "And I think it's after your Series B, unless you had a real banger of a Series A." Transcript, 45:03.

Could you prove it?

Kayne’s bar was a legal one: if you were investigated, could you prove your controls ran? Eight questions on how close your program is.

Scorecard · eight questions

Could you prove it?

Answer for your program as it runs today. If two answers fit, pick the lower one.

  1. If a customer, an insurer or a regulator asked you to prove one control ran last Thursday, what would you hand over?

    • The policy that says we do it
    • A screenshot from the last audit
    • The record from that day, from a system that checks the control continuously

    "You need to prove that you're actually collecting evidence on an hourly or a daily basis associated with the control operation." See Continuously.

  2. When a business leader accepts a risk, what happens next?

    • They sign a form and nothing changes
    • They sign, and someone reviews it once a year
    • They own the cost, insurance or a fix, in their own budget

    "Cool. So you're going to pay for the insurance on that." See Then you pay for the insurance.

  3. How many risk registers does your company keep?

    • None. It lives in people's heads
    • Several, by team or business unit
    • One, with written definitions of impact everyone uses

    "Everybody's got their own personal risk register." See Half can't find their critical risks.

  4. What does the board see about security?

    • Counts of alerts, patches and uploads
    • A risk heat map
    • Key risk indicators tied to the KPIs each leader is measured on

    "And then you need to tie a KRI, a key risk indicator, to that." See A KPI and a key risk indicator.

  5. Who checks the claims on your security page, trust center and questionnaire answers?

    • Nobody. Marketing wrote them
    • Security reviewed them once
    • Each claim maps to a control with current evidence

    "like the security statement on their website, which, as best as everyone can tell, was like written by marketing." See A statement written by marketing.

  6. Where does the impact estimate for a risk come from?

    • Security picks a number
    • A model filled in with security's guesses
    • The business leaders who know what the system makes

    "let's partner with the business to figure out what is the potential impact there" See A fictional number.

  7. Are decisions about risk written down?

    • No
    • Sometimes, in email
    • Yes, in meeting notes kept in one place

    "The funny thing, though, is if you don't write it down" See Professor Plum in the library.

  8. Is your security leader, current or future, covered?

    • We haven't thought about it
    • We have D&O insurance, but it doesn't name them
    • D&O covers them by name or by rule, and they're indemnified

    "But if you're not offering them a D&O spot in today's climate, they have really no reason to join your company." See When to hire a CISO.

Paper tiger

Your program reads well and would be hard to prove. Start with one register and one control you check every day, and make the next accepted risk come with its cost.

Partly proven

Some of it is backed by evidence and some of it is backed by memory. Find the controls you only check at audit time, tie one KRI to a leader's KPI, and write the next risk decision down.

Could prove it

Your evidence would hold up on a bad day. Keep it continuous, keep the register in one place, and make sure the person who signs for security is covered.

How long could a failed control go unnoticed?

Kayne gave no numbers for a typical company, so the defaults below are round examples. Count the controls your security page, questionnaires or filings describe, and sort them by how often anyone checks that they work.

Calculator

How long could a failed control go unnoticed?

Four counts: controls checked continuously, at least daily, controls checked about once a quarter, controls checked once a year at audit time, and controls nobody checks on any schedule.

–controls you describe
–with continuous evidence
–days a failure could go unnoticed, on average
–controls you couldn't prove for last Thursday
–controls nobody checks

Of the 40 controls you describe, 20% have continuous evidence. A control that failed today could go unnoticed for 210 days on average, and for 32 of them you couldn't show what happened last Thursday.

These defaults are examples, not figures from the episode. The average counts each control by the longest a failure could last before the next check: a day for continuous checks, 91 days for quarterly ones and a year for annual or unscheduled ones. Kayne's standard in Continuously was evidence collected "on an hourly or a daily basis," and A guest badge on Thursday shows what a single missing day looks like to an investigator.

From the Clue board game to Cyber Risk is a Myth

Everything on this page sits on one timeline, from the board game Kayne brought up to his book. Filter it by thread.

Timeline · 1943 to 2026

From the Clue board game to Cyber Risk is a Myth

Filter by thread. Dates are from the public record except where marked as part of this show.

  1. Cluedo

    Anthony E. Pratt devises the game known as Clue in North America (Wikipedia, on this show).

  2. Conway's law

    Melvin Conway's observation links an organization's communication to the systems it designs (Wikipedia, on this show).

  3. Safeco

    Kayne becomes a software architect at Safeco Insurance, building single sign-on for 250,000 agents (LinkedIn, on this show).

  4. Centrify

    He starts almost 11 years as worldwide professional services director (LinkedIn, on this show).

  5. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework

    NIST publishes the framework the filings cite under several names (Wikipedia, on this show).

  6. Include Cybersecurity

    He co-founds the nonprofit with Carmen Marsh (LinkedIn, on this show).

  7. CISO and CIO

    He becomes CISO and CIO at Pensar Development, until April 2020 (LinkedIn, on this show).

  8. SolarWinds reports the breach

    SolarWinds reports the Orion breach to the SEC (Wikipedia, on this show).

  9. The Cyber Safety Review Board

    The board is established, modeled after the National Transportation Safety Board (Wikipedia, on this show).

  10. Hyperproof

    Kayne joins Hyperproof, until December 2025 (LinkedIn, on this show).

  11. The SEC's rules

    The SEC adopts rules for incident reports on Form 8-K and annual disclosures in the 10-K (SEC, on this show).

  12. The SEC sues SolarWinds

    The suit alleges the company downplayed internal security risks (Wikipedia, on this show).

  13. The first incident reports

    Form 8-K incident reports begin, and the annual disclosures cover fiscal years ending on or after December 15 (SEC, on this show).

  14. The 2024 benchmark

    Hyperproof publishes its fifth annual IT risk and compliance benchmark (Hyperproof, on this show).

  15. The recording

    Jon talks with Kayne while the first Section 1C filings are coming in (on this show).

  16. Eleven topics

    Hyperproof publishes the review of more than 2,100 filings (Hyperproof, on this show).

  17. The GRC Maturity Model

    Hyperproof introduces the model in a webinar (Hyperproof, on this show).

  18. Episode 56 airs

    The episode goes out on Podbean and Spotify (Podbean, on this show).

  19. The review board's members

    All members of the Cyber Safety Review Board are reported fired (Wikipedia, on this show).

  20. The SolarWinds case ends

    The SEC's case against SolarWinds is dropped (Wikipedia, on this show).

  21. Fractional CISO

    Kayne leaves Hyperproof and starts work as a fractional CISO (LinkedIn, on this show).

  22. FedRAMP Moderate

    Hyperproof launches its FedRAMP Moderate-authorized platform (Hyperproof, on this show).

  23. An advisory board

    He joins the advisory board of c² (LinkedIn, on this show).

  24. Cyber Risk is a Myth

    He posts about his book on Chris Clymer's show (LinkedIn, on this show).

What to do this week

Five things, in the order Kayne’s argument suggests.

  1. Keep one register. Put every known risk in one risk register, and write down what low and high impact mean for each kind of risk, reputational, regulatory and financial, so the next assessment argues about the risk and not the words.
  2. Tie a KRI to each leader’s KPI. For each business leader, pick one number they’re measured on and one security signal that predicts it, the way data leaving the company predicts resignations for HR.
  3. Make accepted risks cost something. When a leader accepts a risk, put the cost of insuring it or fixing it in their budget, and record the decision in the meeting notes.
  4. Find your Thursdays. Take the controls your security page and questionnaire answers describe, and check whether you could show evidence for each one on any given day. The calculator above shows how big the gap is, and the scorecard covers the rest.
  5. Plan the security leader’s seat. Before you hire a CISO, make sure your D&O insurance covers them, by name or by rule, and that they’re indemnified. Until then, our vCISO team can lead the program, our SOC 2 Type 2 team can get the report your customers ask for, and you can book 15 minutes with us.

Key takeaways

  1. Cybersecurity risk doesn't exist on its own

    Kayne said CISOs have been wrong to call cybersecurity a risk of its own. It is a factor in business risks, and boards engage when security ties to the business objectives and KPIs they already track.

  2. The SEC asked for four topics, and the best filings covered eleven

    Kayne counted about 11 factors in the most robust Section 1C disclosures, where the SEC requires four. Hyperproof's March 2024 review of more than 2,100 filings found almost half of companies sharing information on eleven topics.

  3. Too little disclosure costs confidence, too much invites a demand for proof

    A light filing can cost the confidence of investors and the SEC. A detailed one has to survive a breach, when a regulatory subpoena asks the company to prove what it said, such as multi-factor authentication for every user.

  4. Don't run a paper tiger

    A control that works on paper but doesn't exist in reality was the disclosure Kayne expected to go worst, from a litigation and enforcement perspective. One company made up a framework for its public filing.

  5. Collect evidence continuously, not at audit time

    Kayne's standard was evidence of each control's operation collected hourly or daily. He tied continuous assurance to a reduced risk of breach in Hyperproof's 2024 survey, and called it correlation, not causation.

  6. Tie a key risk indicator to each leader's KPI

    Counts of uploads and USB disks bore a board. Tied to HR's employee satisfaction goal, data leaving the company about six weeks before people resign becomes a leading indicator.

  7. Make an accepted risk cost something

    When a business leader accepts a risk, the CISOs Kayne knew who made a difference had them pay for the insurance on it. A five- to six-figure hit to their P&L changes the conversation, where a signature on a form changes nothing.

  8. Size impact with the business, not alone

    Kayne called it a fiction that a CISO can use something like FAIR to put a number on a risk's impact alone. The sales and engineering leaders know what a system makes, and a number without them is fictional.

  9. Write the risk register down, once

    Some companies have no risk register and others have five or 12. Kayne's test was whether a company could show in writing what a low-impact reputational risk or a high-impact regulatory risk is.

  10. If it isn't written down, it's a game of Clue

    Investigators come back to who, what, where, when and how. After a breach, the legal team and the incident response team both ask engineering to show how each control was operating.

  11. The missing Thursday is the finding

    A guest badge log complete for every day but Thursday draws the investigator's question, whether or not anything happened that day. The gap in evidence is what matters.

  12. Structure matters less than proof

    A centralized security org and a distributed one are both viable, Kayne said. What matters is sustainability, observability and transparency, and proving it to the standard of a legal investigation.

  13. SOC 2 Type 2 is turning into table stakes

    An outside attestation is a market distinguisher until everybody has one. Jon pointed to AI startups coming out of stealth with SOC 2 Type 2 reports and $70 million seed rounds.

  14. Hire a CISO after the Series B, with D&O in place

    Kayne's answer was after the Series B, unless the Series A was a real banger, once there is a product worth securing, a business model that has proved out, and D&O coverage that names the CISO or covers them by rule.

  15. Give back to the field

    His closing advice to senior leaders was to give back, bring different ways of thinking into security, and influence a young person or a career changer, one-on-one or en masse.

Chapters

Tap a chapter to play from there.

Pull quotes

“I am a theater kid who eventually decided that there was not a lot of money in theater.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And I took the improv skills that I'd earned and parlayed that into a cybersecurity career, which is a weird origin story, right?”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And my special skill that I've most recently adopted, and it wasn't on my bingo card for this year, is reading investor regulatory filings for the SEC in the 10-K.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And so the reason I started studying it is it's never been done before, and there's going to be a train wreck in there.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And somebody's going to do it really well, and somebody's going to do it not so well.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“like the security statement on their website, which, as best as everyone can tell, was like written by marketing.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“That sets up a really interesting narrative: if you don't disclose enough, investors might not have confidence, or the SEC might not have confidence.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And when a regulatory subpoena shows up on your front, it's not a good day.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“because a filing that's made right now exists in perpetuity and it's a public record.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“They're going to have these same level expectations because for them, this is their new normal.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And there are about 11 factors that I found that came across all the most robust 10-K Section 1C, and the SEC only requires four of those.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“But SOC 2 is not going to be, it's not going to cut it.”

Jon McLachlan ·

“So, for example, one of the top factors is use of literally any cybersecurity framework.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And that's a broader topic of, when something happens, who knows when, who tells who?”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“So there's some disclosures in there that are just pure nightmare fuel”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Because the thing you don't want to get caught out in is running a paper tiger where it works that way on paper, but it doesn't actually exist in reality.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Continuously. Continuously. I think that makes a big difference.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“They just full-on made up a fictional cybersecurity framework, and it's in their public disclosure.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“You need to prove that you're actually collecting evidence on an hourly or a daily basis associated with the control operation.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“I want to know that the darn thing works so that I keep paying the bill”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“how can you tell a paper tiger from the real deal?”

Jon McLachlan ·

“I think a lot of us as CISOs have been guilty over the years of, first of all, saying that cybersecurity risk exists. It doesn't. We have business risks. We manage business risks.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Cybersecurity is certainly a factor of business risk, but it is not itself a risk. Controversial opinion, I know.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And then you need to tie a KRI, a key risk indicator, to that. That's a way to get board engagement.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“You put that in front of a board, it's a snooze fest.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“It's a leading indicator for how that point is going to go.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And they say, cool, I accept the risk. Job done. Nothing changes.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Cool. So you're going to pay for the insurance on that.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“If they're just printing money all day long, the board's not going to care.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“You're owning the cost and not just the risk.”

Jon McLachlan ·

“There's this fiction that CISOs can magically use something like FAIR to figure out how much a risk will cost if it becomes an impact, right?”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“let's partner with the business to figure out what is the potential impact there as opposed to just wet finger in the wind and making up a number.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“I read way too many law journals and I'm reading regulatory filings for fun.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“They say they don't have a cybersecurity program, don't plan on having one.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And then they said, for more details, see Section 1C.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Tech companies, actually, software and SaaS providers tend to be some of the best written.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And the company they're at goes, that's a neat idea. We never thought of that before.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“how did you get to be so successful and so large without just the basics?”

Jon McLachlan ·

“do not invent your own cryptography. Just don't do it.”

Jon McLachlan ·

“And yet, GRC has become this intractable space where it's a cult of personality.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“But in terms of civil liability, CISOs right now have boundless civil liability, and that concerns me deeply, right?”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“I had no idea what normalcy looked like.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And so the regulators are becoming more prescriptive.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Everybody's got their own personal risk register.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“one of the first things I'd ask folks was if they could show me in writing what a low-impact reputational risk was, or a high-impact regulatory risk.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“What I've noticed coming up through the engineering ranks is that the software that engineers tend to write will reflect the communication channels within the company.”

Jon McLachlan ·

“Professor Plum in the library with a lead pipe? That's what investigators always come back to: who, what, where, when, how.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“And you want to go through a documentation exercise, they will have you write everything down.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“If you were being investigated as part of a legal investigation, could you prove it?”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“A lawyer does not care about how you structured your company.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“they say, so what happened Thursday? And you go, I don't know.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“Whether or not anything happened on Thursday is not really of interest at that point.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“I think at some point we're going to hit table stakes where everybody's got a SOC 2 Type 2, right?”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“They came out of stealth with a SOC 2 Type 2.”

Jon McLachlan ·

“I go back and forth on this one. And I think it's after your Series B, unless you had a real banger of a Series A.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“But if you're not offering them a D&O spot in today's climate, they have really no reason to join your company.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“You need to have something worth securing before you dump a bunch of investment on top of it.”

Jon McLachlan ·

“There's a lot of different ways of thinking that we need that are not really well represented today.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

“There's only the one of me. Thanks, mom and dad, for the unique name.”

Kayne McGladrey ·

About the guest

Kayne McGladrey, Former Field CISO, Hyperproof

Kayne McGladrey was the field CISO at Hyperproof when this episode was recorded in March 2024, a role his LinkedIn lists as CISO in residence from September 2022 to December 2025, where he led Hyperproof's annual IT benchmark surveys. He started in theater and improv, did security audits for government agencies in the late 1990s, was a software architect at Safeco Insurance and a systems engineer at Cingular Wireless, spent almost 11 years as worldwide professional services director at Centrify, ran information security services at Integral Partners, was CISO and CIO at Pensar Development from 2018 to 2020 and led strategy and GRC at Ascent Solutions. He co-founded the nonprofit Include Cybersecurity with Carmen Marsh in 2018. He is a CISSP and a senior member of the IEEE. Since December 2025 he has worked as a fractional CISO, in August 2026 he joined the advisory board of c², and he is the author of Cyber Risk is a Myth, from CRC Press. On the episode he explains the SEC's new cybersecurity disclosures, paper tigers, continuous evidence, key risk indicators, D&O coverage for CISOs and when a startup should hire one.

About the host

Jon McLachlan is co-founder of YSecurity, the on-demand cybersecurity team for startups, and of Cyberbase.ai. The Security Podcast of Silicon Valley is hosted by Jon McLachlan and Sasha Sinkevich. Jon McLachlan on LinkedIn ↗

Context and sources

  • Kayne McGladrey on LinkedIn: a CISSP and senior IEEE member, fractional CISO since December 2025, on the advisory board of c² since August 2026, CISO in residence at Hyperproof from September 2022 to December 2025, strategy and GRC practice lead at Ascent Solutions from April 2020, CISO and CIO at Pensar Development from September 2018 to April 2020, co-founder of Include Cybersecurity from January 2018, director of information security services at Integral Partners from November 2016, worldwide professional services director at Centrify from January 2006, and earlier roles at Cingular Wireless and Safeco Insurance. Source ↗
  • SEC press release 2023-139, July 26, 2023: rules requiring registrants to disclose material cybersecurity incidents on Form 8-K, generally within four business days of determining materiality, and to describe their cybersecurity risk management, strategy and governance every year under Item 106 of Regulation S-K in the 10-K. Source ↗
  • Hyperproof, Cybersecurity in Financial Disclosures: 11 Topics for 10-K Filings, March 25, 2024: a review of more than 2,100 Section 1C filings from January 1 to March 11, 2024, with eleven topics, three of them marked as required. Source ↗
  • Hyperproof, the fifth annual 2024 IT Risk and Compliance Benchmark Report, February 23, 2024: a survey of more than 1,000 IT and GRC professionals, with 59% reporting a data breach in the previous 24 months and 49% struggling to identify critical risks to prioritize remediations. Source ↗
  • Hyperproof, Introduction to Hyperproof's GRC Maturity Model, a webinar, August 1, 2024. Source ↗
  • Hyperproof, The GRC Maturity Model: How Mature is Your GRC Program. Source ↗
  • Hyperproof, Introducing Hyperproof's FedRAMP Moderate Authorized Platform, March 12, 2026. Source ↗
  • Hyperproof, author page: Kayne McGladrey, Former Field CISO at Hyperproof. Source ↗
  • Kayne McGladrey on LinkedIn, October 28, 2026: talking about his book on Chris Clymer's show, and why calling something cyber risk makes it sound like a specialist's problem. Source ↗
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Transcript

Automatic transcription. Jon McLachlan hosts this episode with Kayne McGladrey. There is no diarization on the tape, so speaker labels were assigned from the content and checked passage by passage against reference recordings of each voice from this episode and by pitch, and a few short lines may sit with the wrong speaker. Names and terms were normalized where the recognizer misheard them (Jon McLachlan, Kayne McGladrey, Hyperproof, YSecurity, SOC 2, D&O, FedRAMP, SIEM, Clue). Words in [brackets] are best guesses where the audio is unclear. Answers are transcribed as spoken, with repeated words and false starts trimmed. Short backchannels such as "yeah", "right" and "mm-hmm" are left out where they overlap the other speaker.

Read the full transcript 9,139 words

Jon McLachlan

Hello, everyone, and welcome to another episode of the Security Podcast of Silicon Valley. I'm your host, Jon McLachlan. This is a YSecurity production, and I am joined today by a very special guest, Kayne McGladrey. Welcome to the show.

Kayne McGladrey

[Thanks for having] me on today, Jon. I've been excited to be talking with you and your audience today.

Jon McLachlan

We're happy to have you. Kayne is the CISO at Hyperproof. Maybe you'd like to share a little bit about your background, Kayne.

Kayne McGladrey

Yeah, so I am a theater kid who eventually decided that there was not a lot of money in theater. I took my first semester of college and realized that wouldn't work. And I took the improv skills that I'd earned and parlayed that into a cybersecurity career, which is a weird origin story, right? Most people have got degrees and stuff. And me, on the other hand, I remember doing security audits, both in person as well as physical security as well as network security for government agencies in the late 90s and making a lot of it up as I go along, which was exciting. I was supported by a really good team back then, and have had the privilege of being supported by many good teams as well as three mentors over the course of my career. And I've worked, I've run worldwide professional services. I've been a CISO at a defense industrial base company. I currently am the field CISO at Hyperproof. And my special skill that I've most recently adopted, and it wasn't on my bingo card for this year, is reading investor regulatory filings for the SEC in the 10-K. I can now read those in about two seconds at a crack, which again, like when I thought I was going to be singing and dancing on Broadway, none of this was on my bucket list of stuff to do.

Jon McLachlan

Maybe a different type of singing and dancing.

Kayne McGladrey

This is true. And I still am very comfortable on stage and with a live audience.

Jon McLachlan

Let's share with our listeners maybe what are the disclosures related to the 10-K FCC regulations?

Kayne McGladrey

So the reason I've been tracking that is most companies have had this concern over disclosing how or if or what they're doing around cybersecurity. And so late last year in October, the Security and Exchange Commission in the United States said, hey, look, you have to tell us how you're managing your risks and how the board and how management are doing with cybersecurity. And all of the CISOs I know, and I run an invite-only CISO roundtable for about 100 close friends, and they're all worried because nobody's made a regulatory filing disclosure saying, here's how we manage our cybersecurity risks, here's how the board gets involved. And so the reason I started studying it is it's never been done before, and there's going to be a train wreck in there. And somebody's going to do it really well, and somebody's going to do it not so well. And the second part of that is last year, before this regulatory change went into effect, Tim Brown of SolarWinds had done a really bang-up job of helping disclose to the CSRB, the Cybersecurity Review Board, about how they had been dealing with Russia being all up in their cybers. And unfortunately, the SEC felt fit to file a civil lawsuit against Tim Brown, the CSO of SolarWinds, as well as SolarWinds, based on statements that were not regulatory in nature, like the security statement on their website, which, as best as everyone can tell, was like written by marketing. So they already decided: hey, we're going to go enforce based on their alleged non-operation of security controls and what was in a non-regulatory filing. Now we've got regulatory filings by CISOs and their boards saying, here's what we do to manage our cyber risk. That sets up a really interesting narrative: if you don't disclose enough, investors might not have confidence, or the SEC might not have confidence. And if you disclose too much, there was the fear put forth by many law journals that the threat actors are going to be able to figure out how you're doing the cybers and thereby attack your company more effectively, which haven't seen that happen yet. But also, there's the fear that if you disclose too much and you make a material misstatement, that the SEC, if there's a breach and they decide, hey, we're going to go hard on enforcement, that they'll say, prove it. Like you said you were running, I don't know, multi-factor authentication for all of your end users. Prove that to us. And when a regulatory subpoena shows up on your front, it's not a good day. And so that's why I've been reading into all of these disclosures to find out how many people are going to do the barest minimum, how many of them are going to go further. How many of them probably got... I hope they got a sales discount from their vendor because I can think of a couple that like mention specifically who their vendors are, which is an interesting thing.

Jon McLachlan

What is not some sideways avenue of marketing or exposure to risk?

Kayne McGladrey

I can think of one that specifically said we use Microsoft Azure for our entire tech stack, all up. And another one mentioned who they had for EDR and who they had for IR and doing a variety of other technologies. All of this is going to produce for a very interesting regulatory and litigation space in 2024 and beyond, because a filing that's made right now exists in perpetuity and it's a public record.

Jon McLachlan

A lot of the listeners are founders themselves or they work for startups in the security space. And if I'm one of these founders in a security startup and I'm part of one of these companies' supply chains or I'm a vendor to one of these companies, what does that really translate to for me?

Kayne McGladrey

So there's two parts to it, I guess. I'm going to oversimplify. The first is that most startups want to eventually either get acquired or exit via a PE or they want to go public. And so if you want to go either of those routes, your institutional investor, your PE, or alternatively, the public market are going to want to see that you are doing the cybers in a reasonable fashion. Now, we're not talking about like the reasonable cybersecurity standard, which is still not a litigation or legal standard, but they want to see you look like the other companies that are doing cybersecurity. And there are about 11 factors that I found that came across all the most robust 10-K Section 1C, and the SEC only requires four of those. So companies have really been disclosing more as a way of assuring investors. And so there's 11 topics, and you have to be prepared to talk about those. But the other thing to keep in mind is that if you are, maybe not, this is not your year to go public. Okay, cool. Do you share a board member? Because if you share a board member with a board or two members who have also sat or currently sit on a publicly traded company's board, they're going to be asking these same questions. They're going to have these same level expectations because for them, this is their new normal. And I think that's going to end up throughout the entire ecosystem of startups and suppliers who are not publicly traded currently, as board members and institutional investors start thinking: this is normal. Everybody talks about these things. This is just an expected disclosure that we'd see everybody would make. And if you can't make that, or alternatively, if it's very unpopular within your industry cohort, generally popular, if you're not, if you don't have that left-right visibility for what the middle of the road looks like, you're going to have a bad time, I suspect.

Jon McLachlan

Yeah, I suspect so too. In terms of an action item that you would suggest that all of these security vendors and these startups, like, maybe take on? Would that be something along the lines of, would SOC 2 Type 2 help them get over that [bump]? You mentioned there was 10 or 11 of these 1C disclosures, and you only have to pick four. But SOC 2 is not going to be, it's not going to cut it.

Kayne McGladrey

Yeah, so I've got a blog post up that will be up after this podcast is finished recording about those 11 factors.

Jon McLachlan

And we will definitely link to that in our description. So, just...

Kayne McGladrey

That's fantastic. But these go beyond things like having a SOC 2 or an ISO. That's part of it, though. So, for example, one of the top factors is use of literally any cybersecurity framework. Don't care which one, [NIST CSF], which in one case was called the NIST CFS and in several cases was just called the NIST framework comes up quite a lot. And the reason for that is that companies are using that as a proxy to say, we know what we're doing because we're following an industry standard. But another section that comes up there too, beyond just a framework, is governance. And that's a broader topic of, when something happens, who knows when, who tells who? And some of these are tremendously detailed disclosures. Some of them are a little lighter on details, but it has to be included in there. That's something that the SEC did not require. Same thing with frameworks. If you think of something that they did require, how are you managing your cybersecurity risk? Okay, cool. You look at the section 106, what is it, Regulation 106 or 108 S-K? Anyhow, they have required disclosures. One of them is risk assessments or risk management. Something nobody expected would be in there, but is very much in the cultural zeitgeist of cybersecurity right now, is third-party risk management. And companies are spending an inordinate amount of time disclosing to the point that I've seen companies, I don't want to do business with them. If we have an opportunity to win them as an account, no, because they have an 11-step process that involves sending, I think, in one case, like, even if you've got an ISO 27001 certification, right, as well as your SOC 2 Type 2, they will send you an auditor to audit your organization in four hours because somehow they think they're going to do better in four hours than ISO 27001 and a SOC 2 Type 2. So there's some disclosures in there that are just pure nightmare fuel, but my point is that companies have to be prepared to talk about this, and they also have to have the confidence that what they're disclosing is factually correct. Because the thing you don't want to get caught out in is running a paper tiger where it works that way on paper, but it doesn't actually exist in reality. I think that's going to be a bad time from a litigation and enforcement perspective. Again, I'm not a lawyer. I'm not making legal advice.

Jon McLachlan

No, neither of us are lawyers. But I would suppose that Hyperproof, if you use that as a product and you have that high-level visibility and you have the constant reinforcement that the controls are being audited daily?

Kayne McGladrey

Continuously. Continuously. I think that makes a big difference. I think there was one cybersecurity disclosure from a company, and they made up a framework. They just full-on made up a fictional cybersecurity framework, and it's in their public disclosure. I won't say who. And all I think of is if they'd had Hyperproof, they would have opened their dashboard, they would have seen the programs they had, boom, done. Job done, easy. You need to prove that you're actually collecting evidence on an hourly or a daily basis associated with the control operation. Job done. Again, so that's really limiting that regulatory and investigative risk associated with the material breach, but also, if you think about it, if you're actually checking to see if your controls are running, like, as a CISO, that matters to me. I want to know if I'm paying a vendor money for a thing, a service, maybe it's EDR, maybe it's something else, maybe it's SOC as a service, right? They're doing a security operations center for me. They're looking at my SIEM. I want to know that the darn thing works so that I keep paying the bill and being able to have that continuous inspection and confidence, and then being able to report that up to my board and to my investors. I think that's really essential in today's world to really limit the spread of the risk associated with data breaches, which is, funny enough, one of the things we found in our 2024 IT survey, where we found companies that took that automated, that continuous assurance approach towards their GRC platform or towards managing risk, I should say, had a substantially reduced risk of having a data breach. And it's not correlation, like it's not causation, it is correlation, I should say, where we're not saying this is absolutely a way to avoid the risk of a data breach, but it makes sense. If people are looking at the same thing, at the same set of facts, they're going to make way better decisions than if they're having to [flip] between three or five different Excel spreadsheets to figure out how we're managing a risk associated with this today.

Jon McLachlan

And this is being reported up to the board of directors. And the board of directors is essentially allocating resources of the company at the leadership level, right? And making decisions and judgment calls about how much more investment to be put into security or if it's how, if you're on one of those boards, how can you tell a paper tiger from the real deal?

Kayne McGladrey

I think that's really challenging. And what I've seen effectively work with boards isn't what we've been doing. I think a lot of us as CISOs have been guilty over the years of, first of all, saying that cybersecurity risk exists. It doesn't. We have business risks. We manage business risks. Cybersecurity is certainly a factor of business risk, but it is not itself a risk. Controversial opinion, I know. But the other thing we've been doing is we've been failing to tie to business objectives. As we talk to the board, what matters most to them is their KPIs, key performance indicators for the company. Right. If you, as a cybersecurity professional, head of security, CISO, director, whatever your title is, as you're preparing that, what is the business leader's KPI by which they are measured? And then you need to tie a KRI, a key risk indicator, to that. That's a way to get board engagement. So a good example that comes to mind: risk of data exfiltration, right? Let's talk about how many people uploaded stuff to Google Docs or Dropbox or put in a USB disk into their computer. You put that in front of a board, it's a snooze fest. They wonder, why are you here? Why are you telling us this? We don't care. Exactly. If you take the strategy of, maybe HR has a goal of saying, how happy are our employees? What's our employee satisfaction? We know, as cybersecurity professionals, people, about six weeks before they dip, about six weeks before they decide, I'm done, I'm leaving, I'm going to go look for another company, they exfil all their data. They're a salesperson, their book of business, whether they're an engineer, all of their code that they've got in the repo. They take it all with them and then they leave in about six weeks. And so, if you're talking to your HR professional about their key performance indicator of, I want to make sure the employees are happy, we've got a key risk indicator. If you want to say, talk about data exfiltration. It's a leading indicator for how that point is going to go. We need as leaders to think of these intersectional points where we can bring in the data we have and use that to enrich the larger organizational viewpoint of how successful the business will be.

Jon McLachlan

I love tying security back into the business because you can do security all day long. You could have any budget under the sun and you could burn it all and still have business risks at the end of the day. But if it is a very controversial opinion, you can't let good be the enemy of perfect in the cyberspace, just as any space inside of a business, engineering, HR, sales, whatever. But especially in cyber, it's tempting to get drawn into the perfect image of like perfectly secure systems, and I would argue that those don't exist, that there's always going to be risk and that we have to navigate that risk, and to help us navigate that risk, you have to put on sort of the lens of the business. And what does the business need at the end of the day? And I think like most businesses are interested in growing. I know that SOC 2 Type 2 often is like the go-to growth mechanism. Like, look, we're taking our security maturity and our operational maturity seriously, like indicator. As you get into those larger companies, it's, I'm happy to hear that people are caring and that things are changing. It sounds like they're changing for the better.

Kayne McGladrey

The other thing is actually getting business owners to buy into cybersecurity. Something that's come to me from a few friends who are CISOs is the traditional risk assessment, risk decision of how are we going to manage this risk. So we've identified a risk. The risk is above our risk tolerance threshold. We send the risk form over to the business leader and we say, here, sign this. And they say, cool, I accept the risk. Job done. Nothing changes. And then we wonder why are we continuously living a dumpster fire. And I think the CISOs that I know who've made a difference in this space, same basic process. You identify a risk, it's above the threshold, you go to the business leader and you say, hey, there's this risk. Do you want to accept it or do you want us to work on mitigating this together? And they say, I want to accept it. Cool. So you're going to pay for the insurance on that. And suddenly the narrative changes drastically because if, and this is happening at several companies that I know and have friends at, they say, wait, you're telling me I'm going to take a five to six figure loss on my P&L for this quarter to buy incident response insurance and remediation insurance against a risk, depending on the size of the business, that will suddenly drive change. For a business leader who might have been reluctant, who you might have, as I say, so you might have gone to the board and showed: look, here are our SLAs for how long vulns and risks can be open and this one department does nothing. If they're just printing money all day long, the board's not going to care. But if you can create that recognition that there is a cost here, if you can make them own that cost, it makes them more likely to engage and more likely to, whether it's get rid of a legacy system, whether it's actually patch their [manky] systems, whatever it might be, it provides an incentive that they can understand and take ownership in. Because if their KPI is financial performance, cool, let's tie this risk to your financial importance. Because if the risk were to be realized, think of like a ransomware incident, for example, those seem popular these days, it's going to affect multiple aspects of the business, including theirs. So for them, I won't say it's necessarily meeting the standard of due care, but it certainly feels adjacent to saying they at least bought an insurance policy against that happening, or paid into the main cyber insurance policy rather than just YOLOing it and figuring we're just going to keep doing business and this cyber person can talk to us about some technical thing. I don't know what he said, big deal. And then three weeks later, they have a material incident that affects everybody. I think we can move towards avoiding that by getting, again, that partnership. Even in that case, if it's a bit draconian, then saying, look, you have to pay for an insurance policy. It's working, right? And we have to have that level of engagement with other business leaders.

Jon McLachlan

No, I love that because you're not owning the risk. You're not performing risk transference as a CISO onto the business decision leader. You're actually transferring cost, like the actual cost of cost and ownership. You're owning the cost and not just the risk. Yes, that's incredible. And it's all just in positioning and how we talk about these things. And as business leaders, as security experts, we have to have that business perspective to get traction sometimes.

Kayne McGladrey

Yeah. And it's also necessary when you're scoping a risk. There's this fiction that CISOs can magically use something like FAIR to figure out how much a risk will cost if it becomes an impact, right? And I don't think that's true. And the reason I don't think that's true is as a CISO, I can ask the salesperson, the sales leader, I can ask the engineering leader, how much does this thing make on an hourly basis? But I don't inherently know that myself. I don't have that sense of how much money happens in a given quarter or how much cost happens in a given quarter. And I think when we're doing our risk assessments and trying to do an impact analysis, we have to take a collaborative approach with other business leaders at our organizations, because otherwise we're throwing a fictional number in front of them and they could be like, where did this come from? A legitimate question. What is this? It absolutely is. And so I think that ethically, we as CISOs and security leaders, don't have the ability to put forth a material number. And this is especially in light now of what the SEC is doing around materiality, bringing it back to that, for us to make assertions that aren't based on facts. I think if we're going to do an impact analysis, let's partner with the business to figure out what is the potential impact there as opposed to just wet finger in the wind and making up a number.

Jon McLachlan

So do you have a favorite disclosure going back to those C1 disclosures?

Kayne McGladrey

Oh boy, there are a few that... So if you follow me on LinkedIn, you'll see a whole bunch.

Jon McLachlan

Your LinkedIn, I just have to say, is hilarious and so much fun to follow. Everyone should follow it. The last one that I saw was, like, the bear, or, reporting, sad bear sitting on the park bench, who said, because he reported some noncompliance thing, but the FCC already knew about it or something.

Kayne McGladrey

Yeah, that was about the DOJ whistleblower. But I'm trying to, here's the thing: I am a former Twitter, now whatever it's called, I was on that platform, got really good at my meme and cat GIF game, and/or cat JIF game.

Jon McLachlan

[Oh, God], I'm going to start that war.

Kayne McGladrey

Oh, and then, do we just open that? Twitter just ruined everything. And I'm bringing that same mentality of, LinkedIn is way too serious. I inherently talk about serious, dull, boring things. I read way too many law journals and I'm reading regulatory filings for fun. How do I at least bring a little bit of interest into that? So, when I think of ones that come to mind, follow me on LinkedIn. There is a wine company that I'm pretty sure is one of the worst that I've read. There's the whole category of SPAC, special purpose acquisition company, where they just don't do cybersecurity at all. They say they don't have a cybersecurity program, don't plan on having one. It's also known as a blank check company. I had to look up what the heck that is. And then there are a few that I've seen where one of them said, it was this wonderful circular reference. They said that they were required to disclose these things by the SEC as said by the regulation, and it would be in Section 1C. And then they listed out all the regulatory requirements that they had to meet. And then they said, for more details, see Section 1C. And the whole time, I'm thinking, is for more information, reread this poster, right? There's just no information in there. It becomes a circuit, or a couple of them have been combative in nature where it's really forced by the SEC to disclose these things. Okay, great. Do you think that's going to really go well with the... Now, I know there's an SEC staff attorney who is reading my analysis. I hope this gets in front of them, because I'd be curious to see their take on how companies are reacting to this. Because some are welcoming it. They're being very transparent. And others, like I say, especially the combatively toned ones, I can't think that's going to go well for them.

Jon McLachlan

Was it a technology? Was that a technology company, the one that's a little bit combative?

Kayne McGladrey

Several of them. Tech companies, actually, software and SaaS providers tend to be some of the best written. I think the only ones that are more comprehensive are in the aerospace and defense space. And rightly admittedly, I do have a personal bias in that I was in A&D. However, I think that the software companies and the SaaS companies are doing a really good job. They especially are likely to... It's funny. I've talked to a lot of CISOs who suggest the concept of let's have a risk register. And the company they're at goes, that's a neat idea. We never thought of that before. And you wonder, like, how did you get so far as a grown-up business presumably run by adults without having a risk register with the stuff written down? And CISOs are bringing that in. And they're in these tech companies now where you see they have some of the most comprehensive disclosures around risk, around governance, around board level intersections where they're actually communicating with the board. They disclose how those happen. In some cases, they're even bringing in external expertise, so consultants to advise the board on additional matters where they're really leaning in hard. Whereas other, I think it's the oil and natural gas field exploration category. I don't know if cybersecurity is a thing. But then again, if you think about the oilfield business, actually the whole oil business, I used to do risk, try to do risk and assessments for those companies and making money their way out of anything of less than, I think, a quarter billion dollars was sort of their risk threshold. It's like anything above that line might be a business risk. We'll get back to you. So you try to raise cybersecurity matters.

Jon McLachlan

No, it's a lot of money... That's a lot of space to absorb risk. A billion dollars, huh? I guess a million dollars is not a million dollars anymore, but still. And for these companies that, okay, we'll leave that one to this side. But for these companies where, you know, they're like, oh, risk registry, that's a very nice idea. Maybe we'll do that at some point. Part of me is with you, and [half of me] is, how did you get to be so successful and so large without just the basics? Like, are we still teenagers here with running the company? But in another sense, like, we're always learning, we're always growing. And maybe they just didn't have the right person with the right expertise at the right place, the right time to help them nudge the group, the organization. It's funny. I have this view of companies are just groups of people, right? We get together, we want to change the world, we want to make a better product, we want to provide a service to our fellow human beings. And you get together and you do something useful that's also useful for another group of people. And there's a certain type of responsibility that you have to the folks in that company, to the folks that you're servicing. Whether your product or your service. And I'm always willing to give people the benefit of the doubt that people want to do the right thing. It's just that our life experiences, they can be so different at sometimes that the answer to that question, like, what is the right thing to do, will vary wildly if you have a diverse group. Hope we all enjoy each other's diversity, but in that sense, you're going to get a lot of different answers. And standards are nice. Right, standards are nice. These, the C1 disclosures are, there's certain things that we just don't want to have to reinvent over and over ourselves again. In cryptography, for example, like you have this rule number one in cryptography: do not invent your own cryptography. Just don't do it.

Kayne McGladrey

That is very true. It goes to an area that I've been working on for some time now, which is the concept of a maturity model for governance, risk, and compliance. And the reason that I've been doing that is I talk to a lot of CISOs who GRC ultimately reports into them, and they know what they're doing, but they couldn't tell you how to get better at it. And if you think at cybersecurity, we have maturity models. Well, we have many maturity models ultimately of varying qualities that give us a sense of how do I get better at this thing? And yet, GRC has become this intractable space where it's a cult of personality. If you have somebody who's been at one of the big four companies, maybe they were a partner or a senior partner or they were on track to be a partner. They probably have a very well-rounded view of how do we do governance? How do we do compliance? How do we actually manage this and how do we make it better? But if they don't, they've got somebody who's well-meaning, but their life experience hasn't shown them what good looks like or what bad looks like. They just know, how do I meet the standard that was established? And the challenge then becomes, those companies don't have a path forward. And so when they want to do something, maybe they're a startup, they want to go get a SOC 2 Type 2 and they don't know how to do it. Or maybe they want to go get an ISO 27001 or whatever it might be. And it becomes very difficult for them because they haven't had those experiences and they haven't built that organizational muscle memory. So something that I've been working on towards that is a maturity model, where instead of saying just do governance better, because that's like saying be healthy. That's like saying, I don't know, have better relationships, right? You've got to be more specific than that. What is be healthy? Does that mean eat better? Does that mean be better at sport? What is the specific thing there? Trying to say what is inside of the sphere of governance? What are the core business processes and what are those core outcomes? And within risk, same thing. What are the core things? Why do we do this? How can we actually get better at that? I hope to publish something later this year in this space, because I think without that, I think that there's going to continue to be a lot of flailing, well-intentioned flailing by people who don't know that there's a better way. But where that comes to a concern for me is, as a person who has a lot of friends who are CISOs or senior levels of senior leaders in security, the amount of civil risk that we carry becomes a big disincentive to staying in the career. If you do not have D&O and if you don't have indemnification, you're not on the, you don't have an umbrella policy, which I just mentioned, that's a whole whack of insurance just to do your job. And you are dependent on an organization that doesn't know how to get better at doing their job and everything they write down that you sign in some cases is a reason you could go to court and lose everything. I saw... That's the Joe Sullivan thing. I'm thinking more the Tim Brown thing, right? But in terms of civil liability, CISOs right now have boundless civil liability, and that concerns me deeply, right? I saw a study last year before the SEC thing came out that said 75% of CISOs were considering leaving their job because of mental health reasons. I cannot imagine that got better in 2024 with the SEC now saying, yeah, Section 1C is a thing. You all need to file this out. And Tim Brown's going to have a bad time also, right? So the intent of me working on this space is to give people that discipline and that peace of mind so that as they realize this is a risk to me, this is a risk to my organization, how do we get the organization's maturity level to improve so that not are we only more resilient as a business, not are we only more effective as a business, but also that our senior leaders don't just panic and dip one day because they realize this job sucks because I could go to court just for showing up.

Jon McLachlan

Yep. No, and I think I speak for many of the leaders out here. Thank you for the leadership too. All the gratitude in the world for stepping up and providing some foundation for this. And perhaps even that group of 100, I'm sure, shares a huge debt of gratitude to you as well.

Kayne McGladrey

They haven't received the draft document that I've received. They haven't received that draft document. It's about 180 pages so far. So a few of them have said I'd love to read it. Now, okay, cool. It's currently like, I'm doing a final editorial scan. It's early days, but I'm hopeful because the world we live in right now, I think about when I first got into system security, when I first got into this space, like I said, I transferred over from being a theater kid. I had no idea what normalcy looked like. And I do not think that I would have chosen this career if I realized the amount of social pressure, the amount of economic pressure, the amount of litigation, and the amount of personal liability that our professionals pick up in this job. And it's not got any better, right? I didn't think that I'd be, like when I got into this, that I'd be reading regulatory filings and litigation and jurisprudence, which is a $5 word. I didn't think this would be my day job of advising companies how to avoid these things or how to better think about them. And as we've seen, because of, and [I] get the sense, there's people at regulatory agencies who are just frustrated, who aren't seeing progress. They keep seeing people's personal data getting breached. They keep seeing the transfer of funds from Western nations to Eastern nations, not to call Russia, [just to] name-drop some Russians there, right? I think there's a level of frustration. And so the regulators are becoming more prescriptive. And I get the sense that's not going to change. And so, what can we each do? What can I do? What can we each do within our community to try and make that a little bit better for everyone?

Jon McLachlan

Yeah, exactly. That's a mark of a real leader: you're helping the community. You step [back] and you look in the bigger picture and you go after large problems that are not just specific for your company or organization. And so recently, you actually presented Hyperproof's fifth annual IT benchmark survey. And I noticed that one of the more interesting statistics to come out of that was that nearly half of the companies struggle with identifying critical risks so that they can prioritize the remediation. Do you think that's an indicator, or why does that matter?

Kayne McGladrey

So I think that is a product of how companies have not had risk management discipline beforehand. If you think of my earlier remarks about how could companies get to be a grown-up company with business leaders without having an actual risk register, but it also comes down to those companies that have got five risk registers or they've got 12 risk registers. Everybody's got their own personal risk register. And depending on the type of business, okay, sure. Like at a very mature, at a global defense company, I would expect to have different risk registers with certain controls to prevent people from seeing certain stuff because that's just the nature of the beast. But at other companies, no, not so much. The inability to find critical risk information really informs not only business strategy, but also insurance and also career frustration. If a CISO is in a risk conversation and they are not privy to the fact that the reason they didn't get budget is because their company has decided to do a global expansion and that's where they're putting their money, that CISO is going to be frustrated, right? Or alternatively, if there are five business units and each one has its own different risk register and they also have their own different way of measuring risk. Again, you get frustration when people are trying to prioritize it. When I used to do executive advisory work, one of the first things I'd ask folks was if they could show me in writing what a low-impact reputational risk was, or a high-impact regulatory risk. Don't tell me verbally, show me on paper, because if they don't have that, and it sounds so remedial and so stupid, but you get these dumb fights where people have an argument when they're doing a risk assessment over how big of a risk is that? Does it matter? Well, if you don't have a common language that you're all agreed upon, and then you disambiguate that throughout five different risk registers or just stuff in people's heads, that is what drives that problem.

Jon McLachlan

What I've noticed coming up through the engineering ranks is that the software that engineers tend to write will reflect the communication channels within the company. And so the pieces of software that are connecting and working with other pieces of software, they reflect like the people that are actually talking to each other in this discussion around risk. And do we have a common language around our risk registry? And do we have one central point where we go for our risk registry? It feels like there's maybe a corollary to that, the communication challenge just within a company. And so this goes back to organizational structure. Right? At Apple, there is a prophet. And when this prophet speaks, everyone listens and it's held as a spiritual, non-questioned, like, here's the direction that we're going. That's Apple communication style. So it's very top-down, very flat. But in a startup, you have tons of people just running around doing whatever needs to be done. And you have something in the middle for all of the companies of middle size and different communication channels. And sometimes you get people that are building like little empires inside their part of a company that goes to war with other parts of the company or little pieces, little arguments, whatever. And I'm sure that all of those internal politics just bubbles up and you get something. You get something in terms of your product, your engineering, the code, and how it works. You also get something in terms of risk registry and risk language. Have you noticed that yourself over the years, or?

Kayne McGladrey

I have, yes. I've been brought in to companies to conduct assessments and to determine how they got to where they were and if there are ways to improve it. And often it comes to communications channel breakdowns or it comes down to expectations breakdowns. If there's an annual risk assessment process and only 20 percent of the company knows about it, how well of a treatment of your risks do you think you're going to have? Or if there is an agreed upon means by which you can transfer a risk and nobody's actually following the form and they're just making it up as they go along. Again, these do sound very boring. I'm talking about committee meeting notes, like making sure that there was a committee meeting note that said, here's a person who agreed that they were going to mitigate this risk, and here's another person who said they were going to transfer that risk to insurance. The funny thing, though, is if you don't write it down, often things come down to, do you remember the old Clue board game? Professor Plum in the library with a lead pipe? That's what investigators always come back to: who, what, where, when, how. And it's always around risk management. And if you don't have that centralized repository of evidence... What I've also seen is that companies that lack that discipline of just writing stuff down and keeping it in a central location when they have a breach, or when they have a material incident, when they have a serious thing that goes on in their cybers, and they are subject to not only incident response investigation but also the legal investigation, their engineering time gets consumed by everybody coming in after the fact and asking, show us how that control is operating. And they're getting it from at least two spaces. They're getting it from the legal team in preparation for future litigation, and they're getting it from the internal incident response team to try and figure out what was going on at that point in time. And if that's not written down, if that's not consistently maintained, and again, it just comes down to like people talking and people agreeing, we should write this stuff down, be helpful, have this stuff. You end up with wildly different outcomes. That's something that we're also working on at Hyperproof is a FedRAMP. And you want to go through a documentation exercise, they will have you write everything down. Like you think of engineering code changes and how a code change cycle goes, they are very prescriptive in terms of what has to be written down, how it has to be written down, how often it has to be maintained, how long you have to keep those records for. And when companies, startups are thinking about how would I go get federal compliance so I could sell to an agency, right, it becomes this very difficult challenge to meet the documentation requirements if a company hasn't already got that discipline built in at a lower level for a commercial market. Or if you try to go get ISO 27001 or any of the other ISOs, honestly, they love their documentation, right? You have to have that evidence that you're doing the things you say you're doing. If there is not that culture built in, some pockets of an organization might be doing it, but not everyone consistently. And unless you're at a large enough company that you have a subdivision where they're trying to get GxP, or they're trying to get a FedRAMP, or they're trying to get an ISO, or whatever the thing is. Usually it's an assessment of the entire company's business process. And then you really start to understand how effectively your message has been getting out there, or how effectively you've been doing organizational change management to get everyone to adopt this new way of working.

Jon McLachlan

It makes me think about the two main structures that I've seen around security, one of them is to have a CISO and the CISO has an entire org underneath them and you have product security, you have infrastructure security, you have corporate security, have governance and compliance in there. You also have maybe a red team as a feedback loop that things are happening and you want to double-check, provide evidence for it. And it's all under one org. And then with leadership, you have a healthy tension, I would say, with all of the other pieces. The other way I've seen companies organize security efforts is more distributed, where, you know, your product security is going to be lodged somewhere inside engineering and your corporate security is going to be underneath IT. And I'm not even sure where the red team ends up in an org like that. Maybe over with the engineers and product security, but they would get lended out to IT for IT stuff. And for your DevSecOps, you put them in infrastructure, right next to the DevOps folks. I guess there's pros and cons to each. And given all of these new regulatory requirements, is there one structure that you think might serve a CISO or serve the public interest, like, a little bit?

Kayne McGladrey

I think both of those are viable. What ultimately matters is ongoing sustainability and observability and transparency. So, if you have a distributed security organization where every department has some aspect of it that is responsible for their own security, or whether you've got a centralized security apparatus, I think what matters more is that you have a way of proving it. And when I say proving it, I want to be clear. If you were being investigated as part of a legal investigation, could you prove it? Because if you can't meet that legal standard, and it is a high standard that I advocate for, then you're eventually going to have a bad time. Because you can say, yeah, we totally do that. You can have somebody on the record say verbally, we totally do that. You can occasionally go and collect log files or screenshots that show you're doing the thing you say that you're doing. I think the way the world is moving right now, just due to the amount of litigation we see, you have to have that continuous inspection of control operation, whether or not that is a central apparatus or a decentralized apparatus is immaterial when it comes to litigation. They don't care how you structured your company. That's really not that interesting. The SEC, they don't care. They just want to know what you're doing. A lawyer does not care about how you structured your company. And so to ensure defensibility, you have to make sure that you have a continuous view of what's happening where, and it has to be transparent, because otherwise a smart investigator, and that's whether they're an insurance investigator or a litigator, is going to look at the gaps. Let's take this to a very simple example. Let's say you have a policy that says you log everybody who comes in your front door, you hand them a guest badge. At the end of the day, you get those guest badges back and you have all the records for every day except for Thursday. How's that going to go for you when the investigator, whether they're your cyber insurance provider or your adversarial counsel, they say, so what happened Thursday? And you go, I don't know. They're going to immediately focus in on that. Whether or not anything happened on Thursday is not really of interest at that point. It's that you don't have the evidence to support the argument that says that you were doing the thing. And then if you take a step back and say look at a program like FedRAMP where it's not a compliance once a year type operation, it's a you are in compliance at a continuous basis, and if you don't, you're going to get locked out of seven and eight digit contracts.

Jon McLachlan

Painful.

Kayne McGladrey

Right. You have to be able to prove you have a continuous assurance process. And I think that as companies look at these opportunities, the advantage is you start thinking about cybersecurity, you can weaponize it. You can say this is actually a strategic advantage for us, whether it's your SOC 2 Type 2 or some other external attestation. You can demonstrate to your customers, to your supply chain, that you are more secure than the other alternatives in the same marketplace that you serve. Thereby, you're probably more trustworthy than your competitors.

Jon McLachlan

It's a market distinguisher at that point, right?

Kayne McGladrey

It is. I think at some point we're going to hit table stakes where everybody's got a SOC 2 Type 2, right? I think that's going to be just the norm. It's right, everybody will have that, and it's no longer a market differentiator. It now becomes a blocker to get into a market.

Jon McLachlan

I was looking at all of these crazy little AI startups that are just popping up in the market and they're getting tons of $70 million seed rounds. [One] just unveiled itself, and it had an insane seed round. And they're coming to the tables with a SOC 2 Type 2. I'm like, what? They came out of stealth with a SOC 2 Type 2. I'm like, wow. I see it very quickly becoming table stakes and not just a nice-to-have or market distinguisher. Especially for folks that are going after like larger, larger contracts. But one of the questions that I often get from founders, and this is not like a founder of a security company, this is just a founder in general of a growing organization. I would love to hear your take on this: when is the right time to pull in a CISO, or a security leader?

Kayne McGladrey

I go back and forth on this one. And I think it's after your Series B, unless you had a real banger of a Series A. I think it's your Series B, maybe your Series C is when you start really thinking seriously around bringing in a security leader to be responsible because there's some other things that have to happen in there that often won't have happened before Series B. And it's things like having D&O, directors and officers insurance, making sure that your board members, making sure that your senior leadership team, and then as a way of incentivizing that CISOs will actually want to join your company, that they will be on the D&O, either as a named individual or by rule. I really don't care. But if you're not offering them a D&O spot in today's climate, they have really no reason to join your company. That becomes actually a reason to join your company.

Jon McLachlan

Huge liability. Yeah.

Kayne McGladrey

But also, there's a certain amount of, like, engineering product that has to be out there. There's a certain amount of organizational function that has to be out there. I think a lot of the other business functions need to be built out before... This is funny. I'm almost saying that I'm not saying security is an add-on, but I'm saying centralizing the responsibility for communicating and overseeing the operation of the security apparatus. I think that a lot of well-intentioned people can get you to a Series B. Maybe you have a couple of hits and misses here. That's fine. Everybody does. Companies with CISOs have hits and misses. It's not guaranteed that you're going to have a perfect day every day. But I think that you need to have that organizational discipline and also understand what the company is trying to do. Because unless you're at a cybersecurity company, your business model has to prove out too before you bring in somebody to do security, right?

Jon McLachlan

You need to have something worth securing before you dump a bunch of investment on top of it.

Kayne McGladrey

Yes. Exactly.

Jon McLachlan

Great discussion, Kayne. Thank you so much for joining. Would you like to leave our listeners with any final words of wisdom?

Kayne McGladrey

Boy, words of wisdom. I think you said it earlier on the show, Jon, and it's really about giving back to the community. It's about finding ways that we can help develop and diversify our community and bring in different ways of thinking into what has been a challenging space and a challenging few decades that we've had cybersecurity. I think that if you're a senior leader and you're listening to this, the thing you should be thinking about is: how do I give back effectively and how do I incentivize people to get into this industry? Because there are a lot of reasons to get into our industry. There are a lot of different skills that we need. There's a lot of different ways of thinking that we need that are not really well represented today. And so, if you have the opportunity to influence a young person or influence somebody who's going to change careers, absolutely take that, whether it's one-on-one or whether that's en masse. Beyond that, if you're interested in Hyperproof, check us out at hyperproof.io. If you're interested in me and my meme game on LinkedIn, I'm Kayne McGladrey on LinkedIn. There's only the one of me. Thanks, mom and dad, for the unique name. You'll be able to quickly find me.

Jon McLachlan

Yeah, we'll link to your profile and all of that in the description of the podcast. And huge thank you to all of our listeners for tuning in to another episode of the Security Podcast in Silicon Valley. I'm your host, Jon McLachlan, and this is a YSecurity production. Thank you so much, Kayne. That was amazing.

FAQ

Questions this episode answers

Who is Kayne McGladrey?
Kayne McGladrey was the field CISO at Hyperproof when this episode was recorded in March 2024, a role his LinkedIn lists as CISO in residence from September 2022 to December 2025. He started in theater and improv, did security audits for government agencies in the late 1990s, ran worldwide professional services at Centrify, was CISO and CIO at Pensar Development and co-founded the nonprofit Include Cybersecurity. Since December 2025 he has worked as a fractional CISO, and he is the author of Cyber Risk is a Myth, from CRC Press.
What did the SEC's 2023 cybersecurity rules require?
Adopted on July 26, 2023, the rules require public companies to report material cybersecurity incidents on Form 8-K, generally within four business days of determining an incident is material, and to describe every year in the 10-K how they assess, identify and manage material cybersecurity risks, how the board oversees them and management's role. The annual part applies to fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2023, and the incident reports began on December 18, 2023. On the tape Kayne placed the change late in 2023, in October.
What is Section 1C of the 10-K?
It is the cybersecurity section of the annual report, where companies make the disclosure required by Item 106 of Regulation S-K. Kayne read the first wave of them in early 2024 and found the most robust covering about eleven topics, though the SEC requires four.
What are the eleven topics in the best Section 1C disclosures?
Per Hyperproof's review of more than 2,100 filings, published March 25, 2024: frameworks, governance, risk assessments, risk management, enterprise risk management, third-party risk, compliance, incident response plans, training, the audit committee and the board of directors. The post marks risk assessments, risk management and the board as required.
Why did the SolarWinds case worry CISOs?
The SEC sued SolarWinds and its security chief, Tim Brown, in October 2023, and Kayne noted that the case rested on statements outside regulatory filings, such as a security statement on the company's website that, as best anyone could tell, marketing wrote. CISOs signing the new filings worried about the same exposure. Per Wikipedia, the case was dropped in November 2025.
What is a paper tiger in a security program?
In Kayne's words, it is a control that works that way on paper but doesn't actually exist in reality. In a public filing, he expected it to go badly from a litigation and enforcement perspective, and the fix he described is evidence that each control is operating, collected hourly or daily.
Why does Kayne say cybersecurity risk doesn't exist?
Because companies have business risks, and cybersecurity is a factor in them rather than a risk of its own. Calling it cyber risk, he argues, makes it sound like a specialist's problem, while tying it to business objectives and KPIs gets the board engaged. His book, Cyber Risk is a Myth, makes the same argument.
What is a key risk indicator, and how does it connect to a KPI?
A key risk indicator is an early signal of rising risk. Kayne's method starts with the KPI a business leader is measured on and ties a security signal to it. His example: HR tracks employee satisfaction, and data leaving the company about six weeks before people resign is a leading indicator for that goal.
How do you get a business leader to take a risk seriously?
Make accepting it cost something. Kayne described CISOs who, when a leader chose to accept a risk, had the leader pay for the insurance against it, a five- to six-figure loss on their P&L, which changed the narrative where a signed risk form had changed nothing.
What's wrong with using FAIR to size a risk?
Kayne's objection is to the inputs. A CISO doesn't know how much a system makes an hour or how much money moves through a quarter, so the impact number has to come from a partnership with the business leaders who do, or it is fictional.
Why do so many companies struggle to find their critical risks?
Hyperproof's 2024 benchmark found 49% of respondents struggle with identifying critical risks to prioritize remediations. Kayne put it down to missing risk management discipline: no register at all, or five or 12, each measuring risk differently, without a common language written down.
What does Conway's law have to do with risk?
Jon noted that software reflects the communication channels of the company that builds it, which is Conway's law, and asked whether risk registers do too. Kayne said his assessments often found communication and expectation breakdowns, like an annual risk assessment that only 20 percent of the company knows about.
Which is better, a centralized security org or a distributed one?
Kayne said both are viable. What matters is ongoing sustainability, observability and transparency, and being able to prove your controls operate to the standard of a legal investigation, because a lawyer doesn't care how the company is structured.
When should a startup hire a CISO?
Kayne's answer was after the Series B, or maybe the Series C, unless the Series A was a real banger. By then the company should have D&O insurance, coverage for the CISO by name or by rule, enough product and business functions built out, and a business model that has proved out.
Why do CISOs need D&O insurance?
Kayne said the civil liability CISOs carry has become boundless and is a big reason senior security leaders leave the career. Without D&O insurance, indemnification or an umbrella policy, what they sign can be a reason to go to court and lose everything.
Is a SOC 2 Type 2 enough for a startup that sells to public companies?
Jon said it is not going to cut it on its own, and Kayne agreed that the topics in the best disclosures go beyond having a SOC 2 or an ISO certification, to frameworks, governance, third-party risk and evidence that controls run.
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